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Hands Off Our Fingerprints: State, Local, and
Individual Defiance of Federal Immigration
Enforcement
CHRISTINE N. CIMINI
Secure Communities, though little-known outside law-enforcement circles, is one of the
most powerful of the federal government’s immigration enforcement programs. Under Secure
Communities, fingerprints collected by state and local law enforcement and provided to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for criminal background checks are automatically shared with
the Department of Homeland Security, which checks the fingerprints against its immigration
database. In the event of a match, an immigration detainer can be issued and an individual held
after they would otherwise be entitled to release. Originally designed as a voluntary program in
which local governments could choose to participate, the Department of Homeland Security now
mandates local participation in Secure Communities. Though admittedly an efficient mechanism
to check immigration status, the program and its local implementation create a variety of
tensions. Many local police are concerned that community trust, often essential to effective
policing, is eroded when the police operate as an arm of immigration enforcement. In some
jurisdictions, the program may encourage racial profiling and, in others, jail budgets are
stretched as localities absorb the costs of housing those with immigration holds. And, as pointed
out by many localities, despite being touted as a program that prioritizes the removal of those
who pose a danger to national security or public safety, data shows that approximately twothirds of the detainers issued targeted individuals with either no record of conviction or
conviction for minor offenses. In this Article, I examine Secure Communities from the perspective
of state and local governments and individuals seeking to defy mandatory program participation.
I explore this local defiance from the stage at which immigration enforcement is set in motion,
the sharing of fingerprints information by localities with the federal government. I first analyze
the implications for state and local governments by balancing preemption and anticommandeering concepts in the context of state and local defiance of the federally mandated
program. I then analyze the implications for individuals by exploring the tensions between
privacy and efficiencies inherent in government information sharing, and address whether the
Federal Privacy Act protects individuals from improper fingerprint disclosure. I resolve that a
number of legally viable options exist to enable state and local government defiance, as well as
individual defiance, but that each option has limitations. I conclude that the Secure Communities
mandate overlooks constitutional, statutory, and practical considerations and that the sharing
requirement should be voluntary rather than compulsory.
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Hands Off Our Fingerprints: State, Local, and
Individual Defiance of Federal Immigration
Enforcement
CHRISTINE N. CIMINI∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In the absence of comprehensive immigration reform, states, localities,
and the federal government continue to struggle over the parameters of
immigration enforcement. The role of state and local governments in
immigration enforcement shifted to the national stage when states,
including Arizona,1 Alabama,2 Georgia,3 Indiana,4 and Utah,5 sought to
pass local measures to enhance the federal government’s immigration
∗

Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, Vermont Law
School. Thanks to Christopher Lasch, Doug Smith, Chris Newman, Sonia Lin, Jenny Roberts, Ramzi
Kassem, Amna Akbar, Richard Boswell, Stacy Caplow, Jason Cade, Laila Hlass, Bernard Perlmutter,
Shoba Wadhia, and all of the NYU Clinical Writers’ Workshop participants. Thanks to my colleagues
at Vermont Law School for their support of this Article and to the library staff who helped with
resources in a pinch. A special thanks to Jessica West for her feedback and support. All errors are mine
alone.
1
Support our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450
(codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, 41 (2013)), amended by Act
of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070, (invalidated in part by Arizona v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)), http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf.
2
Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, No. 2011-535, 2011 Ala. Acts
888 (codified as amended at ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-1 to -35 (2013)). This statute has been partially
enjoined. See United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1351 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (enjoining
§§ 11(a), 13, 16, and 17) (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-11(a), -13, -16, -17), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, dismissed in part, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
injunction against §§ 11(a), 13(a), 16, and 17, and concluded that sections 10, and 27 should also be
enjoined. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1301.
3
Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, 2011 Ga. Laws 794 (codified in
scattered sections of GA. CODE ANN. tits. 13, 16, 17, 35, 36, 42, 45, 50 (2013)). This statute was
enjoined in Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F Supp. 2d 1317, 1321–22 (N.D.
Ga. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v.
Governor of Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012).
4
Act of May 10, 2011, Pub. L. No. 171-2011, 2011 Ind. Acts 1926 (codified in scattered sections
of IND. CODE. tits. 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 22, 34, 35 (2013)). Two provisions of this statute have been enjoined.
See Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 F. Supp. 2d 905, 925 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (enjoining Pub. L. No.
171-2011, sec. 20, § 1(a)(11)-(13)) (codified at IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-1-1(a)(11) to -(13)); Pub. L.
No. 171-2011, sec. 18, §§ 1–2 (codified at IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-8.2-1 to -2)).
5
Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, ch. 18, 2011 Utah Laws 260 (codified in scattered
sections of UTAH CODE ANN. tits. 76, 77 (2013)), amended by Act of Mar. 15, 2011, ch. 18, 2011 Utah
Laws 228.
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enforcement scheme. The Supreme Court stepped into the debate in
Arizona v. United States,6 finding many of the states’ legislative provisions
preempted by federal immigration authority.7 At the same time, numerous
states and localities are seeking to limit the reach of federal immigration
enforcement by resisting compliance with federal immigration detainers.
With the issue still hotly contested, much of the scholarship thus far has
focused on the validity of the two conflicting approaches. Do state and
local government attempts to enhance federal immigration enforcement
pass constitutional muster,8 and are state and local government attempts to
defy the enforcement of immigration detainers permissible?9 Instead, this
Article focuses on the question of federal versus state and local control at
an earlier point in time—namely, the moment at which states and localities
share fingerprint information with the federal government and set the
immigration enforcement machine in motion.
In the immigration enforcement context, a program known as Secure
Communities (S-Comm) creates an automatic biometric data sharing
mechanism between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).10 Pursuant to S-Comm, upon
arrest for a local offense, fingerprints that are typically shared by local law
enforcement with the FBI for criminal purposes are also automatically sent
to DHS to check against an immigration database.11 If the check reveals
6

132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
Id. at 2510. It is ironic that the Department of Justice (DOJ) argued that Arizona’s attempts to
enhance immigration enforcement should be preempted, since the DOJ has overseen an unprecedented
expansion of deportations associated with the expansion and mandated participation of states and
localities in the Secure Communities Program. See Sarahi Uribe, The Two Faces of Obama on
Immigration, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica
/2011/aug/29/obama-immigration-secure-communities (noting that S-Comm has led to an
“unprecedented level of deportations”).
8
See generally Kristina M. Campbell, The Road to S.B. 1070: How Arizona Became Ground Zero
for the Immigrants’ Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle for Latino Civil Rights in America,
14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 1–15 (2011) (providing an overview of the context leading up to S.B.
1070); Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 47–51 (2010) (discussing the structural and substantive constitutional issues created
by Arizona Senate Bill 1070); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances:
Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 27–36 (2007)
(contending that “state, county, and local ordinances aimed at regulating general immigration functions
are unconstitutional as a function of exclusive federal preemptory powers”).
9
See generally Christopher N. Lasch, Preempting Immigration Detainer Enforcement Under
Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281, 293–94 (2013) [hereinafter Lasch,
Preempting Immigration] (discussing the preemption of detainer enforcement as civil immigration
enforcement in the context of Arizona’s S.B. 1070); Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration
Detainers After Arizona v. United States, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 636–40 (2013) [hereinafter Lasch,
Federal Immigration] (examining immigration and immigration detainers as civil rights issues).
10
See Secured Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) [hereinafter Secured Communities]
(describing the S-Comm program).
11
Id.
7
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that the individual is unlawfully present in the United States or is otherwise
removable due to a criminal conviction, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) can issue a detainer to local law enforcement
officials.12 The detainer operates as a formal request to hold the individual
in custody for up to an additional forty-eight hours in order to facilitate the
transfer of custody to ICE.13
S-Comm was originally designed as a voluntary program in which
local governments chose whether to participate.14 However, early in SComm’s deployment, the DHS moved away from making agreements with
12
8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2013). Whether ICE will issue a detainer in a specific circumstance is a
complicated question. In 2010, ICE issued interim guidance on the issue suggesting that immigration
officers could only issue a detainer if there was “reason to believe” the individual was “subject to ICE
detention for removal or removal proceedings.” Lasch, Preempting Immigration, supra note 9, at 302–
03 n.95. However, the detainer form used by federal immigration officials included a provision that
allowed federal immigration officials to issue a detainer merely if they wanted to “initiate an
investigation.” Id. at 303 n.96. Prior to December 2012, there was no clear guidance and immigration
detainers could be issued if immigration officials wanted to investigate a prisoner’s status. Id. at 302
n.94. In light of the practice of issuing detainers for investigative purposes only, a challenge was filed
in 2012 alleging detainer illegalities. Id. at 303 n.97. In December 2012, ICE issued detainer guidance
expressly identifying the circumstances in which ICE will issue detainers and revised Form I-247. Id. at
303 n.99. The 2012 revisions clarified that detainers should generally be issued only where there is
“reason to believe” that the individual is an immigration violator and meets a list of identified criteria.
Id. at 304. The “investigation initiated” checkbox has been removed from the form. Id. at 305.
13
8 C.F.R. §§ 287.7(a), (d) (2013). The meaning of a “request” has been a matter of some
confusion and debate. See Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149, 205–09
(2013) [hereinafter Lasch, Rendition Resistance] (describing the ambiguous language consistently used
by ICE regarding whether a detainer is a request or a command).
14
Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network. v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 811 F. Supp. 2d
713, 730–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The district found that:

Initially, federal government officials suggested that the program was voluntary, in
that states or localities could choose not to participate. As a result, a number of
states and localities took steps to remove themselves from the program’s planned
deployment. However, while the instant litigation was pending, the federal
government appeared to reverse course. On October 6, 2010, Janet Napolitano, the
Secretary of DHS, stated during a press conference that “DHS ‘does not view
[Secure Communities] as an opt-in, opt-out program.’” Since that time, the federal
government has consistently asserted that there is no way for localities to opt out of
the program, and that the program will be mandatory by 2013.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE
COMMUNITIES: “SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT” 6–7 (Aug. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/38563566/Ice-Setting-the-Record-Straight-Brainwash [hereinafter SETTING
THE RECORD STRAIGHT] (disputing claims that ICE has been ambiguous in determining whether the
programs are mandatory or voluntary). ICE states:
If a jurisdiction does not wish to activate on its scheduled date in the Secure
Communities deployment plan, it must formally notify its state identification bureau
and ICE in writing (email, letter or facsimile). Upon receipt of that information, ICE
will request a meeting with federal partners, the jurisdiction, and the state to discuss
any issues and come to a resolution, which may include adjusting the jurisdiction’s
activation date in or removing the jurisdiction from the deployment plan.
Id.
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15

local police and began operating at the state level. This created a
perception that localities had limited rights to refuse participation in the
program.16 However, this new approach did not stop localities from raising
objections about S-Comm. Police expressed concern that community trust
might be eroded if the public perceived the police to be an arm of the
federal immigration enforcement regime.17 Community activists exposed
evidence of unscrupulous police officers using S-Comm to facilitate and
conceal racial profiling.18 Local jails experienced an increase in budgets
due to extended holds of individuals on ICE detainers.19 Some politicians
15

See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 1ST
QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT (APRIL–JUNE 2008) FOR SECURE COMMUNITIES: A COMPREHENSIVE
PLAN TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS 9, app. 3, at 32 (Aug. 2008) (ICE FOIA 102674.000095) (on file with author) (“ICE will aim to establish as many [Memoranda of Understanding]
as possible at the state level instead of with each county or [Law Enforcement Agency] to shorten
deployment schedules and encourage state-wide support and coordination.”); see also Letter from
David J. Venturella, Exec. Dir., Secure Comm., to Linda Denly, Bureau of Criminal Identification &
Info., Cal. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 23, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_
communities-moa/california-sc-moa.pdf (“Deployment at the local level requires a signed Statement of
Intent (SOI) by participating agencies that oversee booking locations to ensure those agencies
understand and adhere to the principles set forth in the MOA and a set of Standard Operation
Procedures.”).
16
Letter from Michael Hennessey, Sheriff, City and Cnty. of S.F., to Edmund G. Brown, Jr.,
Att’y Gen., Cal. Dep’t of Justice (May 18, 2010), available at http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article
/Secure-Communities-destroys-public-trust-2373213.php (asking to opt out of S-Comm because the
program “conflicts with local law”); Letter from Zoe Lofgren, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. and Int’l Law, to Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of
Homeland Sec., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., and Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice
(July 27, 2010), available at http://uncoverthetruth.org/resources/docs-reports/july-27-2010-letterfrom-representative-zoe-lofgren/ (noting that “there appears to be significant confusion about how local
law enforcement agencies may ‘opt out’ of participating in Secure Communities”).
17
AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. ET AL., RESTORING CMTY: A NAT’L CMTY ADVISORY REPORT ON
ICE’S FAILED “SECURE COMMUNITIES” PROGRAM 5–8 (2011) [hereinafter RESTORING COMMUNITY],
available at http://altopolimigra.com/documents/FINAL-Shadow-Report-regular-print.pdf; Law
Enforcement Officials Take a Stand Against Secure Communities and SAFE Act, AM. VOICE ONLINE
(Sept. 4, 2013), http://americasvoice.org/blog/law-enforcement-officials-take-a-stand-against-securecommunities-and-safe-act/.
18
While S-Comm is publicized as an immigration enforcement tool, its actual reach is much
broader. Because all fingerprints are shared, regardless of whether there exists a basis to believe the
fingerprints are those of an undocumented immigrant, law enforcement officers can use the program as
an investigatory tool by stopping individuals they suspect might lack proper immigration status. In
jurisdictions where S-Comm is activated, unscrupulous police officers can stop and arrest people based
upon their appearance, assuming that those individuals will be deported, even if they were wrongfully
arrested and never convicted. See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, BRIEFING GUIDE TO “SECURE
COMMUNITIES”—ICE’S CONTROVERSIAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM NEW STATISTICS
AND INFO. REVEAL DISTURBING TRENDS AND LEAVE CRUCIAL QUESTIONS UNANSWERED 3–4 (2010)
[hereinafter BRIEFING GUIDE], available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Secure%20Communities%20Fact
%20Sheet%20Briefing%20guide%208-2-2010%20Production.pdf (finding indicia of racial profiling by
comparing the average, nationwide percentage of non-criminal S-Comm deportations, which is 26%,
with dramatically increased percentages in minority counties—specifically, 82% in Travis, Texas; 79%
in St. Lucie, Florida; 74% in Yavapai, Arizona, and down to 54% in Maricopa, Arizona).
19
Immigrants Behind Bars: How, Why, and How Much?, NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, 10–14
(2011) [hereinafter Immigrants Behind Bars], http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/2011
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expressed concern about the evisceration of the line between policing and
immigration enforcement.20 Others identified the potential for ICE
detainers to be issued in error,21 and the potential for unequal treatment of
U.S. citizens and non-citizens whose immigration status is in question.22
The problems with S-Comm are not limited to state and local
governments; individuals are also impacted. Despite being touted as a
program that prioritizes the removal of those who pose a danger to national
security or public safety,23 ICE data reveal that less than 15% of the
detainers issued in FY 2012–13 targeted those individuals who pose a
danger to national security or public safety.24 Further, the data show that
/immigrants_in_local_jails.pdf (explaining that Secure Communities, and other immigration
enforcement programs, have increased costs associated with detention for local governments).
20
Local Detainer Ordinances: An Overview, TURNING THE TIDE, http://altopolimigra.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/Local-Detainer-Ordinances.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (“What we are
saying in this legislation is we want to maintain the bright line between what federal immigration
officials do and what our local department does. We have worked for years to ensure that there is such
a bright line.” (quoting Council Member Graham, Sponsor of Washington, D.C. Bill)).
21
Id. Commissioner Jesus Garcia (sponsor of the Cook County, Illinois, Bill) stated:
In America, we don’t detain people without probable cause . . . . But these detainers
are not based on probable cause and they have been imposed on US citizens,
including veterans, by mistake . . . . This Ordinance . . . provides a simple, clear rule
that would be easy to implement, and it eliminates any potential risk of liability to
the County that would arise from continuing to comply with ICE detainer requests.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
22
Id. Supervisor Shirakawa, sponsor of the Santa Clara, California bill, stated:
What this policy does is ensure that everyone in our system is treated equally.
United States citizens charged with crimes are released on bail every day. There is
no justifiable reason to treat people’s criminal cases differently just because they are
suspected of having civil immigration issues. The country has no authority to
enforce civil immigration laws. Immigration enforcement is ICE’s job.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
23
See Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration. & Customs
Enforcement, to All ICE Employees (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news
/releases/2010/civil-enforcement-priorities.pdf [hereinafter Morton Memo] (outlining the way ICE
prioritizes removals); see, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION & CUSTOM
ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES: STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU DEPLOYMENT BRIEFING,
NEW YORK STATE 5 (2009) (ICE FOIA 10-2674.000800) (“ICE will focus initially on identifying
removable criminal aliens charged with or convicted of a Level 1 offense . . . . Level 1 offenses include
[t]hreats to national security [and] [h]omicide . . . .”).
24
Few ICE Detainers Target Serious Criminals, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE (Sept. 17, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/330/ [hereinafter Few ICE
Detainers]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
SECURE COMMUNITIES: IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY, MONTHLY STATISTICS THROUGH JUNE 30,
2010, at 2, 8 (2010) (ICE FOIA 10-2674.000079) (on file with author) [hereinafter INTEROPERABILITY
REPORT 2010]. The vast majority (79%) of those deported due to S-Comm are non-criminals or those
who are picked up for low level offenses (Level II and Level III), such as traffic offenses or juvenile
mischief). Id. This statistic reflects the number of individuals deported through S-Comm from October
2008 through June 2010. Id. at 2. The cumulative number of individuals deported through S-Comm
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approximately half of the individuals subject to an ICE detainer had no
criminal history, not even minor traffic violations.25 If the data are
expanded to include traffic violations and marijuana possession, then twothirds of all detainers issued targeted individuals with no record of
conviction.26
Undocumented immigrant parents who have U.S. citizen children have
additional fears that if they are deported, their children will end up in foster
care.27 Victims of domestic violence often do not reach out to local law
enforcement for fear that doing so will result in immigration
consequences.28 In addition to specific communities that are greatly
impacted by S-Comm, unwitting U.S. citizens have been improperly swept
up in the system, unlawfully detained,29 and presumed to be undocumented
immigrants due to data errors.30
during that time period was 46,929, while the total number of non-criminals and low level (Level II and
Level III) offenders deported through S-Com was 37,098. Id.
25
Few ICE Detainers, supra note 24; see also Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing
Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 89 (2013) (evaluating the S-Comm roll-out data). The authors
conclude that:
[T]he data undermine the government’s claim that Secure Communities is
principally about making communities more secure from crime. High-crime areas
were, surprisingly, not a priority in the rollout. It is very difficult to square the lack
of any meaningful correlation between early activation and local crime rates with the
government’s putative desire to target immigration enforcement resources in a
manner designed to reduce the incidence of serious crime by noncitizens.
Id. at 89.
26
Few ICE Detainers, supra note 24, fig. 1. The data historically follows the same trend.
INTEROPERABILITY REPORT 2010, supra note 24, at 2. These statistics reflects the number of
individuals administratively arrested or booked into ICE custody through S-Comm from the program’s
initiation in October 2008 through June 2010. Id. The cumulative number of individuals
administratively arrested or booked into ICE custody through S-Comm was 89,019, while the total
number of non-criminals administratively arrested or booked into ICE custody through S-Comm was
24,706. Id.
27
See APPLIED RES CTR., SHATTERED FAMILIES: THE PERILOUS INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 6, 27 (2011), available at http://arc.org/
shatteredfamilies (reporting that in “in jurisdictions where local police aggressively participate in
immigration enforcement (e.g. 287(g) and Secure Communities), children are more likely to be
separated from their parents and face barriers to reunification.”).
28
See Nomi Dave & Leslye E. Orloff, Identifying Barriers: Survey of Immigrant Women and
Domestic Violence in the D.C. Metropolitan Area, POVERTY & RACE, July/Aug. 1997, at 9–10
(conducting a survey among Latina immigrants in the Washington, D.C. area and finding that 83% of
battered immigrant women interviewed did not contact law enforcement about the abuse and one-fourth
of the battered immigrant women survey participants listed a fear of being reported to immigration as
their primary reason for remaining in an abusive relationship).
29
See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Roy v. L.A. Cnty., No. 2:12-cv-9012-RGK-FFM (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19,
2012) (alleging that the County of Los Angeles and L.A. county sheriff denied bail and held people in
county jail for more than 48 hours on the basis of ICE holds).
30
See Julia Preston, Immigration Crackdown Also Snares Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011,
at A20 (“In a spate of recent cases across the country, American citizens have been confined in local
jails after federal immigration agents, acting on flawed information from Department of Homeland
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As problems with S-Comm continued to grow, so too did the number
of local governments seeking to opt-out of participation.31 Faced with nonparticipation by some localities, the DHS shifted its strategy. The agency
reversed its earlier position that localities could opt-out, to unilaterally
imposing S-Comm on all states and localities.32 Without the localities
ability to formally opt-out, governmental and individual voices of
resistance emerged. Localities that pushed back against federal
enforcement efforts include: Santa Clara County, California;33 Alameda
County, California;34 Champaign County, Illinois;35 Cook County,
Illinois;36 Milwaukee County, Wisconsin;37 and Multnomah County,

Security databases, instructed the police to hold them for investigation and possible deportation.”); see
also, e.g., Complaint at 3–4, Makowski v. Holder et al., No. 1:12-cv-05265 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 3, 2012)
[hereinafter Makowski Complaint] (alleging that ICE held a U.S. Citizen and a U.S. Marine in custody
for two months because of an error in the records kept by federal agencies).
31
See, e.g., Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to Obama’s Immigration Strategy,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2011, at A18 (discussing Illinois’ withdrawal from the Secure Communities
program and the hesitancy of other states to participate).
32
As of the end of 2013, all jurisdictions were required to participate. See Secure Communities:
Get the Facts, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get-the-facts.htm (last visited June 27, 2014) (noting that
“[s]tate and local jurisdictions cannot opt out of Secure Communities”).
33
BD. OF SUPERVISORS, CNTY. OF SANTA CLARA, CAL., BD. OF SUPERVISORS’ POLICY MANUAL
ch. 3, § 3.54 (2014), available at http://www.sccgov.org/sites/bos/Legislation/BOS-PolicyManual/Documents/BOSPolicyCHAP3.pdf.
34
Resolution Regarding Civil Immigration Detainer Requests, Bd. Of Supervisors of Cnty. Of
Alameda, Cal., Res. No. R-2013 (2010) reprinted in Letter from Richard Valle, Supervisor, Dist. 2, to
Board Supervisors, Alameda Cnty. (Apr. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Valle Letter], available at
https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Almeda%20Cty%20CA%20Detainer%20r
esolution.pdf. Local commentators have described the resolution as symbolic and non-binding on the
sheriff. Steven Tavares, Alameda County Supervisors Discourage Sheriff From Detaining
Undocumented Residents, EBCITIZEN.COM (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.ebcitizen.com/2013/04/
alameda-county-supervisors-discourage.html. In adjacent Contra Costa County, the sheriff is reported
to be finalizing a policy that would limit detainer compliance. Malaika Fraley, Contra Costa County
Softening Policies on Immigrant Deportations, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, May 24, 2013.
35
See Letter from Dan Walsh, Champaign Cnty. Sheriff, to U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement (March 8, 2012) [hereinafter Walsh Letter], available at http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.
cloudfront.net/progressivemajorityaction/pages/92/attachments/original/1369418919/Champaign__IL_
Policy_Letter.pdf?1369418919 (refusing to “to hold inmates on a routine detainer”).
36
See COOK CNTY., ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 46-37(a) (2011), available at
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=13805 (“The Sheriff of Cook County shall decline
ICE detainer requests unless there is a written agreement with the federal government by which all
costs incurred by Cook County in complying with the ICE detainer shall be reimbursed.”).
37
See A Resolution Establishing Milwaukee County Policy with Respect to Honoring Detainer
Requests from U.S. Department of Homeland Security—Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
Milwaukee Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, Res. File No. 12-135 (adopted June 4, 2012), available at
https://milwaukeecounty.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1124069&GUID=3D583485-4F014B43-B892-D6FFE5D327BF (adopting a resolution limiting when detainer requests from
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement will be honored).
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Oregon. In addition, towns and cities including: Amherst; Berkeley;40
Chicago;41 Los Angeles;42 Newark;43 New Orleans;44 New York;45 and San
Francisco;46 as well as the District of Columbia.47 California48 and
38

39

Resolution in Support of Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office Revised Plan for 1-247
Immigration Detainers, Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Multnomah County, Or., Res. 2013-032 (adopted Apr.
4, 2013), available at http://multnomah.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id=3&clip_id=
593&meta_id=37732.
39
Henry Epp, Amherst Votes To Opt-Out Of Controversial Secure Communities, NEW ENGLAND
PUB. RADIO (May 22, 2012), http://nepr.net/news/2012/05/22/amherst-votes-opt-out-controversialsecure-communities/.
40
See ANNOTATED AGENDA, BERKELEY CITY COUNCIL MEETING (2012), available at
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/Clerk/City_Council/2012/10Oct/Documents/10-30_Regular_Meeting_
Annotated_Agenda.aspx (voting that “the Berkeley Police Department will not honor requests by the
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain a Berkeley jail inmate for
suspected violations of federal civil immigration law”); see also Letter from Christine Daniel, City
Manager of Berkeley, Cal., to Mayor and Members of the City Council (Oct. 30, 2012) [hereinafter
Daniel Letter], available at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/Clerk/City_Council/2012 /10Oct/Documents/
2012-10-30_Item_19_Consideration_of_Revisions.aspx (outlining draft revisions to the City of
Berkeley’s policy with regards to immigration detainers in the Berkeley jail).
41
See CHI., ILL., CODE § 2-173-042 (2013) (mandating, for example, that no city agency or agent
shall “arrest, detain or continue to detain a person solely on the belief that the person is not present
legally in the United States”).
42
See Editorial, Baca’s Sensible Shift on Immigration—Illegal Immigrants Won’t be Detained for
Minor Offenses, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2012, at A18 (praising decisions by the L.A. county sheriff and
L.A. city police chief to cease cooperating with Secure Communities as “[c]ompliance is optional” and
“it isn’t appropriate for police or deputies to act as immigration agents”).
43
See James Queally, Newark Police First in N.J. to Refuse to Detain Undocumented Immigrants
Accused of Minor Crimes, NJ.COM (Aug. 15, 2013, 9:05 PM), http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/
2013/08/newark_police_first_in_nj_to_refuse_to_detain_illegal_immigrants_accused_of_minor
_crimes.html (last updated Aug. 15, 2013, 9:05 PM) (chronicling Newark’s decision to “opt out of the
most controversial part of the ‘Secure Communities’ program”).
44
See Campbell Robertson, New Orleans and U.S. in Standoff on Detentions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
13, 2013, at A10 (detailing a policy limiting detainer compliance that “came about for a variety of
reasons, including a lawsuit filed in federal court in 2011 by two men who had spent months in Orleans
Parish Prison on expired detention requests”).
45
See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 9-131 (2013) available at http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/
LAWSSEAF.cgi?QUERYTYPE=LAWS+&QUERYDATA=$$ADC9-131$$@TXADC09-131+&L
IST=LAW+&BROWSER=BROWSER+&TOKEN=27866463+&TARGET=VIEW
(requiring
extensive reporting on the numbers of civil-immigration detainees transferred to the custody of federal
immigration officials).
46
See Brent Begin, San Francisco County Jail Won’t Hold Inmates for ICE, S.F. EXAMINER
(May 6, 2011), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/san-francisco-county-jail-wont-hold- inmatesfor-ice/Content?oid=2174504 (describing a policy adopted by San Francisco sheriff Michael
Hennessey to begin releasing low-level offenders over objections of federal agents notified through SComm).
47
See Immigration Detainer Compliance Amendment Act of 2012, D.C. Act 19-442, 59 D.C.
Reg. 10153, 10153–55 (2012) (stating that Washington, D.C. “is authorized to comply with civil
detainer requests from the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement” but will henceforth
“exercise discretion regarding whether to comply with the request[s],” cooperating only if the detainee
has been convicted of a “dangerous crime”).
48
The California “TRUST (Transparency and Responsibility Using State Tools) Act,” aimed at
limiting the state’s compliance with federal immigration detainers, was signed into law on October 5,
2013. See Assemb. B. 4, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (codified at CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 7282,
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49

Connecticut sought legislative solutions—known as TRUST Acts—
limiting the obligation of states to comply with federal immigration
detainers. Similar legislation has been proposed in Florida,50
Massachusetts,51 and Washington.52 To date, state and local resistance has
centered on legislation and policies designed to thwart compliance with the
federal immigration detainer. No state or local government has yet to
legislate or address issues involving the automatic sharing of fingerprints.
In instances where individuals were harmed, groups representing their
interests organized53 and individuals themselves sought remedies by filing
suit.54
Do states, localities, or individuals have any ability to defy the
fingerprint sharing that occurs as a matter of course through the S-Comm
program? From the government perspective, S-Comm’s fingerprint sharing
scheme raises federalism questions regarding the appropriate role of
federal, state, and local governments in the context of federal immigration
enforcement. From the individual perspective, S-Comm’s fingerprintsharing scheme raises questions about the appropriate balance between
sharing information to protect the public and protecting individuals’ right
to privacy.
When states and localities seek to defy the mandate, the analysis is
7282.5 (West 2014)), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_00010050/ab_4_bill_20130624_amended_sen_v97.pdf; see also AB-4 State Government: Federal
Immigration Policy Enforcement, CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNav
Client.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB4 (last visited May 17, 2014) (providing the bill’s history).
49
In June 2013, the Connecticut General Assembly passed, and the governor signed into law, a
bill that will expand the limitations on detainer compliance beyond the Department of Correction to
other state and local law enforcement agencies. H.B. 6659, 2013 Gen. Assembly., 2013 Conn. Acts 13155 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-192(h) (2014)), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/act/pa/pdf/2013PA-00155-R00HB-06659-PA.pdf.
50
S.B. 730, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013). The bill, which would have limited detainer compliance
to cases involving specified “serious offense[s],” id. at 4, died in committee in May 2013. S, 730, OPEN
STATES, http://openstates.org/fl/bills/2013/S730/ (last visited July 6, 2014).
51
H.B. 1613, 188th Gen. Court., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013), available at
https://malegislature.gov/Bills/188/House/H1613. The bill was described as an “Act relative to restore
community trust in Massachusetts law enforcement,” and would severely restrict state participation in
immigration enforcement. Id.
52
H.B. 1874, 63rd Leg., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/
documents/billdocs/2013-14/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/1874.pdf.
53
See APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., supra note 27, at 3 (detailing the results of the Applied Research
Center’s study, which was the first investigation into the harmful implications of immigration policy on
families); Dave & Orloff, supra note 28 (reporting the results of a study on the harmful repercussions
of immigration policy on Latina female domestic violence victims, which would influence the passage
of the Violence Against Women Act).
54
See, e.g., Complaint at 3–4, Makowski v. Holder et. al., No. 1:12-cv-05265 (N.D. Ill. July 3,
2012), ECF No. 1 (alleging that ICE held a U.S. citizen and a U.S. Marine in custody for two extra
months because of an error in the records kept by federal agencies). Some of the individual resistance
used litigation as a tool to address fingerprint sharing. E.g., id. at 1–2 (arguing that the sharing of
fingerprints from the FBI to DHS violated the Federal Privacy Act).
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complex, in part because of the potential overlap of immigration
enforcement and local policing. Typically, the duty to police a community
lies with state and local officials.55 Federal officials are responsible for
enforcing the nation’s immigration system that includes potential civil and
criminal violations of law.56 In the context of S-Comm, where the federal
government seeks to utilize state and local police to enhance its
enforcement tools, Tenth Amendment commandeering concerns arise.57
The question of commandeering in the context of S-Comm is sufficiently
nuanced that DHS itself changed its position on potential Tenth
Amendment implications.58 Part of the rationale behind DHS initially
launching S-Comm as an opt-in program was the agency’s own internal
analysis indicating that forced participation might raise Tenth Amendment
commandeering concerns.59 DHS was later directed to “rewrite” the
memo.60 Thus, on October 2, 2010, the Deputy Principal Legal Advisor of
55
See, e.g., Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1055 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[A]
municipality’s duty to provide police protection is owed to the public at large.”).
56
There is ongoing debate, however, as to whether state and local officials can arrest individuals
for federal immigration crimes. See Lasch, Preempting Immigration, supra note 9, at 291–313
(attempting to resolve the debate).
57
See Connie Choi & Angela Chan, Saying No to ICE’s S-Comm Program, ASIAN AMERICANS
ADVANCING JUST. (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.advancingjustice-alc.org/news-media/blog/
uncategorized/saying-no-ice%E2%80%99s-s-comm-program (“The core legal issues underriding the
opt out question include whether S-Comm violates the 10th Amendment and the anti-commandeering
doctrine.”).
58
See infra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the change in position).
59
One FOIA disclosure discusses the issue:

[Secure Communities’] position that participation in the “Secure Communities
initiative” is voluntary is supported by applicable case-law. Under the Tenth
Amendment, “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to implement,
by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.” Similarly, “[t]he
Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address
particular problems, nor command the States” officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.” Although SC
defines itself as a “plan,” “strategy,” or “initiative,” and not a “program” in official
documents, ICE created SC to address programmatic changes to the manner in
which ICE identifies and removes criminal aliens, and the public perceives it as an
ICE program. Moreover, although the currently CJIS requirement that the LEA
perform a ministerial task may be very minor, and involve no local costs, the
Supreme Court in Printz held that Congress cannot force state officials to even
perform ‘discrete, ministerial tasks’ to implement a federal regulatory program.
Therefore, even though ICE may not truly consider SC a “program[,]” . . . a court
may find that SC’s infrastructure, purpose, and activities mark it a program and,
thus, could find that ICE cannot compel LEAs to participate.”
“Opt Out” Background (2010) [hereinafter “Opt Out” Background] (citations omitted) (quoting Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925, 929–30, 935 (1997)), http://ccrjustice.org/files/Opt-OutBackground.pdf
60
A Briefing Guide to the Secure Communities October 2, 2010 “Mandatory Memo”, CTR. FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 1 (2012), http://ccrjustice.org/files/1-9-12-Briefing-Guide-Oct-2-Mandatory-
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ICE issued a new memo reversing positions and finding that participation
in S-Comm could be made mandatory by the end of 2013 without violating
the Tenth Amendment.61
In the absence of a state or local government challenge to the
fingerprint-sharing protocol, no court has directly addressed the federalism
issues raised by S-Comm’s provision for the automatic sharing of
information from the FBI to the DHS.62 Tenth Amendment jurisprudence
in the commandeering context makes a distinction between actively
engaging in the provision of administrative services, and simply sharing
information—the former being prohibited and the latter being acceptable.
Examining where S-Comm falls along this continuum, this Article
concludes that there are unique features of the S-Comm program that make
it more than just an information-sharing program. Even if it is construed as
a program that requires only information-sharing, such a narrow
interpretation of anti-commandeering limitations in the immigration
enforcement context would be unwise. This Article then proposes that state
and local governments could test the limits of the Tenth Amendment anticommandeering principle by drafting legislation expressly stating that state
and local resources, in the form of police work resulting in fingerprint
gathering, cannot be used for immigration enforcement purposes.
Alternatively, state and local governments could share fingerprints on the
express condition that the federal government does not violate the Federal
Privacy Act63 when sharing the state and locally-supplied fingerprints.
While such legislative proposals raise preemption issues, this Article
attempts to navigate between these two constitutional concepts—anticommandeering and preemption—in the context of state and local
government defiance of S-Comm’s mandate.
The balance is also complex for individuals who are harmed by SComm’s reach. The complexity stems from the government’s need to
effectively balance the desire to share information against the need to
protect individuals’ right to privacy. The protection-of-public rationale for
Memo.pdf (“Gibson directed ICE attorneys to ‘rewrite’ an earlier memo that had supported opt-out and
raised constitutional concerns about making S-Comm mandatory.”).
61
See Email from Section Chief, Enforcement Law Section, U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement to Peter S. Vincent (Sept. 29. 2010, 3:22 PM) (ICE FOIA 10-2674.0003726) (on file with
author); see also Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 827
F. Supp. 2d 242, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“I understand that we are rewriting our memo to OPLA to argue
for the ‘mandatory’ participation in 2013 . . . .”).
62
While I found no court decision that addresses whether the Secure Communities Program’s
forced information-sharing violates the anti-commandeering rule of the Tenth Amendment, one
decision addresses general information-sharing of immigration data under other programs. See City of
New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 34–35 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting the city’s claim that
congressional statutes had commandeered city officials into providing immigration data to the federal
law enforcement agencies).
63
Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1974)).
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sharing information might be more supportable if the program successfully
deported dangerous criminals. Instead, ICE’s own data reveal that the
majority of individuals being deported are not criminals at all.64
Additionally, while U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents are
entitled to seek remedies under the Federal Privacy Act for the improper
sharing of information,65 the federal government’s position is that
disclosure from the FBI to DHS of biometric information amounts to a
“routine use” under the Federal Privacy Act and is thus excepted from
liability.66 Whether the “routine use” exception should be construed so
broadly in the S-Comm context is a question not yet answered by the
courts. This Article explores the balance between protecting the public and
individuals’ rights to privacy in the context of S-Comm, as well as the
Federal Privacy Act’s legislative history, concluding that the “routine use”
exception should not be construed so broadly as to allow the FBI to
automatically, and indiscriminately share the biometric information of all
individuals.67 Instead, this Article proposes an interpretation that limits the
sharing of information and strikes a more appropriate balance between the
rights of the government to share information and the rights of individuals
to privacy protection.
Part II of this Article explores the S-Comm program in-depth,
beginning with the historical documentation of increasing state and local
government involvement in immigration enforcement. This Part proceeds
to describe S-Comm’s actual implementation and concludes with an
examination of S-Comm’s evolution from an opt-in program in which state
and local governments could choose to participate, to a program that now
mandates participation by all localities. Many state and local governments
willingly participate in S-Comm, while others do so only reluctantly. Part
III examines the problems associated with the implementation of S-Comm
along with the state, local, and individual responses to those problems. Part
IV explores issues of federalism that arise when state and local
governments seek to defy participation in S-Comm.68 This Part analyzes
64

Few ICE Detainers, supra note 24 (showing that half of those deported have no criminal

record).
65

5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (2012).
5 U.S.C. § 522a(3) (2012).
67
Since the remedies afforded under the Federal Privacy Act are limited to U.S. citizens and
lawful permanent residents, there may be some constitutional arguments to protect against the
overbroad information sharing that is mandated under the S-Comm program. While such an exploration
is beyond the scope of this Article, others have addressed this topic in related contexts. See, e.g., Lasch,
Federal Immigration, supra note 9, at 2695–978 (arguing that Fourth Amendment concerns are raised
by prolonged detention); see also Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and
Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 408–10,
415–17 (2012) (analyzing both statutory and constitutional issues that arise in the context of remote
biometric identification (RBI) surveillance).
68
See Donohue, supra note 67, at 440 (“The federalization of local information impacts the
relationship of local and state authorities to the federal government.”). State and local governments
66
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the interplay of the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering and
preemption concepts in the context of defiance against S-Comm. Part V
addresses the impact upon individuals swept up in S-Comm’s enforcement
and examines the appropriate balance between protecting the public and
protecting individual privacy rights.
This Article recognizes that any successful comprehensive
immigration reform effort will likely include the enhancement of federal
immigration enforcement at the U.S. border and within the U.S. border. As
more resources are provided for new enforcement programs, existing
programs such as S-Comm will continue to play a critical role in the
enforcement of federal immigration laws. While state and local
governments and individuals have some opportunities to defy S-Comm
compliance, it is unclear how courts will navigate the complex questions
concerning the roles of federal, state, and local governments in
immigration enforcement. State and local governments that continue to
disregard ICE detainers represent only a partial solution. Localities can
consider passing legislation to address the FBI’s indiscriminate sharing of
fingerprints collected by state and local law enforcement authorities—for
example, prohibiting the use of state and local resources for federal
immigration enforcement or, alternatively, only sharing fingerprints on the
express condition that the Federal Privacy Act not be violated. However,
whether such legislation would survive preemption challenges is
questionable. U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, who are
harmed by S-Comm’s broad reach can seek relief under the Federal
Privacy Act, but the statute does not provide protection for undocumented
immigrants or immigrants who have applications pending. This Article
concludes that the Secure Communities mandate overlooks constitutional,
statutory, and practical considerations, and the sharing requirement should
be voluntary rather than compulsory.
II. SECURE COMMUNITIES
Although the S-Comm program69 was first introduced in 2008, state
provide information to the federal government and the federal government then provides information
back to state and local governments—“blurring the federalism divide.” Id. at 461. “State and local
governments are thus both active participants in building federal biometric databases as well as
consumers of federal initiatives.” Id.
69
There is some question as to what to call Secure Communities:
Although [S-Comm] defines itself as a “plan,” “strategy,” or “initiative,” and not a
“program,” its staff is located in the “Program Management Office,” DHS and ICE
has called SC a “program” in official documents, ICE created SC to address
programmatic changes to the manner in which ICE identifies and removes criminal
aliens, and the public perceives it as an ICE program.
“Opt Out” Background, supra note 59.
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and local governments began playing an increasing role in immigration
enforcement prior to that time.70 This Part will describe the evolution of
state and local governments’ increasing role in immigration enforcement
and examine the structure of the S-Comm program. This Part will conclude
by detailing S-Comm’s evolution from an opt-in program to a mandatory
participation program.
A. Increasing Role of State and Local Governments in Immigration
Enforcement
The U.S. Constitution provides broad powers to the federal
government to regulate immigration.71 Federal legislators decide U.S.
immigration policy and federal agencies administer immigration
admissions and removals. However, because there are both civil72 and
criminal73 violations of immigration law, enforcing immigration laws is
complex. Because of this complexity, it was generally accepted that state
and local police do not have the authority to enforce federal civil
immigration laws. While state and local police worked with federal agents
on criminal matters, they generally avoided civil immigration enforcement.
This demarcation of authority continued until the late 1990s, when the
roles of federal and state governments in immigration enforcement became
less clearly defined.
In 1996, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a memo detailing the
limits of state and local authority to enforce immigration laws and
concluded that state and local officials did not have the authority to enforce
70

See Aarti Kohli et al., Secure Communities By the Numbers: An Analysis of Demographics and
Due Process, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTIT. ON LAW AND SOC. POL’Y 1 (2011),
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf (reporting that “annual
deportations have increased over 400% since 1996 and more than a million people have been removed
from this country since the beginning of the Obama administration . . . .”).
71
The Federal Government has broad power over immigration, derived from numerous
Constitutional sources including: the power to establish a “uniform Rule of Naturalization,” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Congress’s power “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states,” id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Congress’s power to declare war, which authorizes the exclusion
and expulsion of enemy aliens, id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 11; and the Implied Foreign Affairs Powers, see
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (stating that the Foreign Affairs Power is
the foundation for all federal control over immigration).
72
Civil violations include illegal presence and failure to depart after the expiration of a temporary
visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2012).
73
Criminal violations include illegal entry, re-entry after deportation, and failure to depart after an
order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012). Criminal violations are more complicated by the fact that in
order to be criminally liable for the failure to depart after an order of removal, the government must
show that the individual “willfully” failed to depart. 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (a) (2012). Many removal orders
are entered in abstentia, making it hard to show that the failure was “willful.” If the government is
unable to show a “willful” failure to depart, the offense is a civil, rather than criminal, violation. See
Backgrounder: Immigration Law Enforcement by State and Local Police, NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM
1 (rev. 2007), available at http://immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/Backgrounder-StateLocal
Enforcement.pdf [hereinafter Backgrounder].
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74

civil immigration laws. Based upon this interpretation, a state or local
police officer could not detain a non-citizen without independent
authorization, because the immigration violation was a mere civil
violation, not a criminal offense. However, the 1996 Congressional session
saw the passage of several laws that began to expand the power of state
and local law enforcement officials to enter the immigration enforcement
realm in certain defined circumstances. The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act expanded the power of state and local law enforcement
over immigration by authorizing state and local law enforcement officers
to arrest and detain unlawfully present noncitizens who had “previously
been convicted of a felony in the United States.”75 The Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) empowered the
Attorney General (now the Secretary of DHS) to authorize local officials to
enforce civil immigration laws when “an actual or imminent mass influx of
aliens . . . presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal
response.”76 The Act also added section 287(g) to the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which allows the Attorney General to delegate
immigration enforcement authority to state and local police pursuant to a
formal agreement between the state or local agency and the DOJ, provided
that the state or local officers have undergone adequate training to enforce
immigration laws.77
Congress also passed two measures designed to enhance cooperation
between the federal government, states, and localities. A provision of the
IIRIRA mandates that “a Federal, State, or local government entity or
official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or
official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”78 And, a
provision of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, known as the Personal
Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, states that “no State
or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted,
from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization
Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful,
74
Memorandum from Teresa Wynn Roseborough, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alan Bersin, U.S. Att’y, S. Dist. of Cal. (Feb. 5, 1996) (on file with author) (opining that
state police lack the authority to arrest aliens on the basis of civil deportability).
75
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 8 U.S.C. § 1252c(a) (2012).
76
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) (2012).
77
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012). Such agreements
are often referred to as “287g agreements.”
78
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), § 642, 8
U.S.C. § 1373 (2012). The statute also specifies that “no person or agency may prohibit, or in any way
restrict, a Federal, State, or local government entity” from “[m]aintaining” or “[e]xchanging . . . with
any other Federal, State, or local government entity” information regarding any person’s “immigration
status, lawful or unlawful.” 8 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (2012).
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of an alien in the United States.”
An even larger shift occurred after the tragedy of September 11, 2001.
With a different administration in place and a new fear of uncontrolled
terrorism, more expansive interpretations of the extent of state and local
law enforcement official involvement in immigration enforcement took
hold. Internally, the executive branch pronouncements were less than clear
about the new shift. The Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice
Department, under Attorney General John Ashcroft, revised the 1996
memorandum regarding the role of state and local police in immigration
enforcement, concluding that state and local law enforcement had
“inherent authority” to arrest and detain immigration violators, including
civil violators.80 The memo was not immediately released. Instead, then
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales issued a 2002 letter to the
Migration Policy Institute suggesting a more moderate position than the
unconstrained “inherent authority” position taken by the Office of Legal
Counsel.81 Gonzales’ memo indicated that state and local police had
authority “to arrest and detain persons who are in violation of immigration
laws and whose names have been placed in the National Crime
Information Center.”82 Even this more moderate position indicated an
expansion of state and local police power, because in 2002, absent
Congressional authorization, the Justice Department began to enter certain
civil immigration violations into the National Crime Information Center.83
This lack of clarity created a great deal of confusion among state and local
police officers, including some who began to participate in immigration
enforcement in a variety of forms.
B. Interoperability and The Secure Communities Program
In 2002, Congress passed the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act.84 The Act instructed the executive branch to develop
and implement an interoperable electronic data system between law

79

8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2012).
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen. to John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. 3, 13 (Apr.
3, 2002), available at https://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf (reversing a prior opinion and
concluding that “states have inherent power, subject to federal preemption, to make arrests for
violations of federal law”).
81
Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Demetrios G. Papademetriou,
Migration Policy Inst. (June 24, 2002), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20030315103114/
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/files/whitehouse.pdf.
82
Id.
83
See Backgrounder, supra note 73, at 5 (“In 2002―without Congressional authorization―the
Justice Department began to enter certain other civil immigration violations in the NCIC.”).
84
Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 548 (May 14, 2002) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1778
(2012)).
80
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85

enforcement and immigration officers. While the DOJ developed initial
interoperability plans prior to the September 11th attack,86 it was not until
the passage of the 2002 Act that meaningful progress was made.87 The
plain meaning of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform
Act and its legislative history demonstrate that Congress intended ICE to
have ready access to the FBI’s records whenever ICE is confronted with an
immigration enforcement decision against an individual.88 To meet that
objective in accordance with the statute, the FBI and DHS originally
planned a more limited disclosure of fingerprints. As set forth in the Secure
Communities Memorandum of Understanding, DHS would place in a
database, accessible to the FBI, fingerprint images and related data for
“high priority subjects,” as selected by DHS.89 After signing that original

85
Specifically, the EBSA instructed that the President “shall develop and implement an
interoperable electronic data system to provide current and immediate access to information in
databases of Federal law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community that is relevant to
determine whether to issue a visa or to determine the admissibility or deportability of an alien . . . .” 8
U.S.C. § 1722(a)(2) (2012). Immigration was one of many areas in which Congress passed legislation
reinforcing the importance of information sharing among federal agencies. See, e.g., Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No 108-458, § 7402, 118 Stat. 3638, 3850
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012)) (increasing the authority of the Department of
Homeland Security to utilize private sector resources that would assist it in preventing, or responding
to, terrorist acts); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 102(a), (b)(3), 116 Stat.
2135, 2142–43 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. §§ 112(a), (b)(3) (2012)) (creating the position of
Secretary of Homeland Security and requiring the Secretary to “take reasonable steps to ensure that
information systems and databases of the Department [of Homeland Security] are compatible with each
other and with appropriate databases of other [federal] Departments”); Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001
(USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 701, 115 Stat. 272, 374 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 3796h(4) (2012)) (authorizing the establishment of enhanced information-sharing systems
between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies).
86
See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY 2 (2005), [hereinafter
IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY 2005] available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/USVISIT_IDENT-IAFISReport.pdf (describing how the DOJ developed this interoperability plan to
coordinate efforts between DHS and the FBI in March of 2000).
87
See Donohue, supra note 67, at 457 (“But it was not until after the attacks that INS (and its
successor, DHS), together with DOJ and DOS, made substantial progress.”); see also IDENT/IAFIS
INTEROPERABILITY 2005, supra note 86, at 2–3 (outlining the progress of IDENT/IAFIS
interoperability after the September 11th attacks).
88
See 8 U.S.C. § 1722(a)(2) (2012) (outlining the accessibility of the information in the electronic
data system); 147 CONG. REC. S12247-05 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2001) (statement of Sen. Edward
Kennedy) (explaining that a main purpose of the national security legislation is to ensure that antiterrorism personnel “have access to important intelligence information”); 147 CONG REC. H10465-01
(daily ed. Dec. 19, 2001) (summarizing the measures in the EBSA for achieving adequate interagency
information sharing); 148 CONG. REC. H2137-01 (daily ed. May 7, 2002) (“[T]here is an exigent need
for the equipment, related items, or services in order to support interagency information sharing under
this title . . . .”).
89
Memorandum of Understanding among the Department of Homeland Security, the Department
of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, and the
Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs for Improved Information Sharing Services 5 (July 1,
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memorandum, the FBI and ICE changed positions, deciding to interpret
Congress’s grant of authority to allow for the development of a real-time
electronic flow of records and information between the two agencies
regardless of an individual’s immigration status.90 Thus, the fingerprints of
U.S. citizens and non-removable lawful permanent residents are
indiscriminately exchanged, along with the fingerprints of undocumented
immigrants.
The program designed to effectuate this interoperability, S-Comm, was
introduced by the Bush administration in March 2008 and piloted in
fourteen jurisdictions beginning in October of that year.91 Under President
Obama, the program has expanded dramatically. As of August 2012, 3,074
of the total 3,181 jurisdictions were activated in S-Comm, representing a
97% activation rate.92 ICE plans to have the program active in all
jurisdictions in the United States by the end of September 2014.93
S-Comm mobilizes local law enforcement agencies’ resources to
enforce federal civil immigration laws. Pursuant to S-Comm’s Standard
Operating Procedures, once a state or local jurisdiction is activated under
S-Comm/Interoperability, all fingerprints submitted by local law
enforcement to the FBI’s criminal background database—known as the
Integrated
Automated
Fingerprint
Identification
System—are
automatically transmitted from the FBI to DHS’s immigration database—
known as the Automated Biometric Identification System.94 The FBI thus

2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/dhsfbiinteroperabilitymoujuly
2008.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted).
90
See Donohue, supra note 67, at 457–58, for a thorough discussion of how the interoperable
system was phased in.
91
In 2006, two counties (Suffolk County, Massachusetts, and Dallas County, Texas) participated
in the “interim Data Service Model (iDSM)” pilot project that was the precursor to Secure
Communities. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECOND CONGRESSIONAL STATUS
REPORT COVERING THE FOURTH QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR SECURE COMMUNITIES: A
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS 8–9 (Nov. 7, 2008) (ICE FOIA
10-2674.000143–10-2674.000144), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities
/congressionalstatusreportfy084thquarter.pdf. In 2007 and 2008, five more jurisdictions were added to
the pilot: Harris County, Texas; Wake County, North Carolina; Henderson County, North Carolina;
Buncombe County, North Carolina; and Gaston County, North Carolina. Id. These jurisdictions were
also some of the first participants in the expanded interoperability program known as Secure
Communities. See id. at 10 (“As explained in the Q3 CSR, Secure Communities used five main criteria
to establish the first 47 jurisdictions to participate in the Interoperability rollout.”); see also Kohli et al.,
supra note 70, at 1 (describing the implementation and expansion of the Secure Communities
initiative).
92
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ACTIVATED
JURISDICTIONS i (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/scactivated2.pdf.
93
Id.
94
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE)
SECURE COMMUNITIES (SC) STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP), §§ 1.0, 2.1, at 3–4, available
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initiates immigration reviews against the Automated Biometric
Identification System, based upon information obtained by local law
enforcement authorities, without the consent of the individual being
investigated or the state and local law enforcement agencies.
After the FBI makes the initial disclosure of fingerprints and records to
DHS, the FBI receives the results of the search in the Automated Biometric
Identification System database.95 As S-Comm/Interoperability was initially
conceived, if the fingerprints matched a record in the Automated Biometric
Identification System database, the FBI would then disclose the
individual’s fingerprints and record to the ICE Law Enforcement Support
Center through the transmittal of an Immigration Alien Query.96 The ICE
Law Enforcement Support Center, in coordination with the appropriate
ICE field office, would then determine whether to follow up with
immigration enforcement and whether it should issue an immigration
detainer.97 In October 2008, however, the FBI approved a change in its
policy whereby it would automatically send an Immigration Alien Query to
the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center for any fingerprints that did not
match a record in the Automated Biometric Identification System database
(a “no match”) and that belonged to an individual born outside of the
United States.98 Immigration detainers are issued by the ICE field office
and instruct local law enforcement to detain the individual for an additional
forty-eight hours after local authority expires so that ICE can assume
physical custody of the individual.99 Immigration detainers remain in effect
even if an individual is transferred to a different facility. “Unlike arrest
warrants and criminal detainers, immigration detainers may be issued by
border patrol agents [including aircraft pilots], special agents, deportation
officers, immigration inspectors, and other employees of ICE,” and they
may be issued “without the review of a judicial officer and without
meeting traditional evidentiary standards.”100
at http://epic.org/privacy/secure_communities/securecommunitiesops93009.pdf (last visited June 26,
2014) (describing the process of sending fingerprints from the FBI to IDENT).
95
See id. at 3 (“[C]riminal bookings occurring subsequent to an initial arrest in NFF states result
in transmission of a Criminal Print IDENT (CPI) file maintenance message to the FBI CJIS
Division.”).
96
See id. at 4 (“If there is a positive fingerprint match in IDENT, FBI CJIS will send an automatic
Immigration Alien Query (IAQ) to the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC).”).
97
See id. at 4–5 (providing the standard operating procedures for the LESC to issue an
immigration detainer).
98
See First Amended Complaint Exh. H, Makowski v. Holder et. al., No. 1:12-cv-05265 (N.D. Ill.
Jul 3, 2012) (alleging that the FBI “automatically transmitted” fingerprints to the DHS).
99
Lasch, Rendition Resistance, supra note 13, at 154–58 (discussing whether an immigration
detainer is a request or a command).
100
8 C.F.R. § 287.7(b) (2012). KAMALA D. HARRIS, OFFICE OF THE CAL. ATT’Y GEN.,
INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 2012-DLE-01, RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES UNDER SECURE COMMUNITIES 2 (2012), available at https://www.aclunc.org/docs/
immigration/ag_info_bulletin.pdf (“Unlike arrest warrants and criminal detainers, however,
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ICE specifically states that the S-Comm program is designed to
remove non-citizens based upon a system of priorities.101 In a
memorandum issued by ICE Director John Morton in June 2010, ICE
outlined its removal priorities. ICE’s primary focus was on dangerous
criminal aliens; convicted criminals, aggravated felons in particular; those
who pose a danger to national security or public safety; and fugitives who
have already been ordered removed by an immigration judge.102
Despite this clear pronouncement of priorities, S-Comm has not been
implemented as described.103 According to ICE’s own statistics, as of May
2011, more than 8.4 million fingerprints were submitted through S-Comm
and checked against DHS’s immigration database.104 Of the 8.4 million
submitted, just over 560,000 matched an immigration record and more than
260,000 were detained in ICE’s custody.105 The S-Comm program has led
to the arrest by ICE of more individuals with no criminal history than any
other category, amounting to a total of 61,234 arrests since the program
began.106 As S-Comm has expanded, so too has the number of individuals
with no criminal history targeted by ICE under S-Comm.107 Particular
immigration detainers may be issued by border patrol agents, including aircraft pilots, special agents,
deportation officers, immigration inspectors, and other employees of ICE, without the review of a
judicial officer and without meeting traditional evidentiary standards.”).
101
See 2010 Morton Memo, supra note 23 (“For purposes of prioritizing the removal of aliens
convicted of crimes, ICE personnel should refer to the following new offense levels defined by the
Secure Communities Program, with Level 1 and Level 2 offenders receiving principal attention.”).
102
Id.
103
See SECURE COMMUNITIES, NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, 1 (2011), http://www.immigration
forum.org/images/uploads/2011/SecureCommunitiesPolicyAnalysis.pdf
[hereinafter
SECURE
COMMUNITIES] (stating that the program has not “perform[ed] as advertised”). This report states:
Many states and localities have expressed confusion, frustration and outrage as
DHS’s explanations of Secure Communities have shifted, as jurisdictions have been
added to the program without public awareness, and as DHS has backtracked on the
voluntary nature of the program. But far louder have been the objections that Secure
Communities does not perform as it was advertised. Although the program is touted
by ICE as focusing on the removal of “dangerous criminal aliens,” in fact it has
identified and led to removal proceedings for hundreds of thousands of non-citizens,
a substantial number of whom have no criminal record at all, or who were simply
detained for a traffic violation or minor offense.
Id.
104

Id.
Id.
106
Id. at 3.
107
See id. (noting that individuals with no criminal history comprise the largest group targeted by
Secure Communities). This report states:
105

In total, ICE has arrested more than 61,000 individuals with no criminal records who
were nonetheless identified by a local jail under Secure Communities. Another
52,000 were convicted of only minor offenses, such as traffic violations. Total Level
1 arrests since the program’s inception closely follow this, with 58,000, but
represent a decreasing proportion of ICE actions. This decrease indicates that ICE is
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jurisdictions have even more alarming rates of arrests of non-criminals. In
Louisiana, for example, since S-Comm was adopted in November of 2009,
“69.9% of individuals arrested had no criminal record, and another 15.6%
were convicted of only minor offenses,” resulting in 85.5% of the
individuals swept up in S-Comm having no criminal record or only a minor
offense.108
More recent numbers show that as of August 31, 2012, the FBI has
disclosed 19,891,149 fingerprints to DHS under S-Comm Interoperability,
of which ICE has identified 1,087,881 for possible immigration
enforcement.109 Thus, 18,803,268 (or 95%) of the fingerprints disclosed by
the FBI to DHS likely belong to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent
residents who have not committed offenses that would make them
removable. Pursuant to ICE Director John Morton’s guidance, since ICE
cannot assert its civil immigration enforcement authority over U.S.
citizens, individuals who claim to be U.S. citizens or lawful permanent
residents should be prioritized in processing.110
C. S-Comm: From An Opt-In to a Mandatory Program
To support this change of position, the Deputy Principal Legal Advisor
for ICE drafted a memo, dated October 2, 2010, that concluded that
participation in S-Comm would be mandatory by 2013 because it did not
create legitimate Tenth Amendment concerns of unconstitutional
compulsion of states in a mandatory federal program.111 Based upon that
legal advice, around October 7, 2010, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano
confirmed the agency’s view that S-Comm was not intended to be

in fact not improving their targeting of more serious offenders, but instead rounding
up broader numbers of low-priority immigrants.
Id. at 3 n.7.
108
Id. at 3.
109
See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES MONTHLY
STATISTICS THROUGH AUGUST 31, 2012 IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY 2 (2012), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide_interop_stats-fy2012-to-date.pdf (reporting the
cumulative amount of Alien IDENT Matches and immigration enforcement cases).
110
ICE Director John Morton asserted: “As a matter of law, ICE cannot assert its civil
immigration enforcement authority to arrest and/or detain a [United States citizen]. Consequently,
investigations into an individual’s claim to U.S. Citizenship should be prioritized . . . .” Memorandum
from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, to all Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Directors, on Superseding
Guidance on Reporting and Investigating Claims to United States Citizenship (Nov. 19, 2009),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/usc_guidance_nov_2009.pdf.
111
Memorandum from Riah Ramlogan, Deputy Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of Homeland
Sec., to Beth N. Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., Immigration and Customs Enforcement 9 (Oct. 2,
2010) [hereinafter Ramlogan Memo], available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Mandatory-in-2013Memo.pdf.
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voluntary. ICE then “unilaterally revoked its S-Comm Memoranda of
Agreement with individual states in August 2011 and declared its intention
to expand S-Comm nationwide by 2013.”113
Touted as a tool to improve public safety by deporting dangerous
criminal aliens, ICE first introduced S-Comm on a county-by-county basis
with voluntary participation.114 The original decision to adopt the program
as optional stemmed from the possibility that mandated participation might
run afoul of the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering concepts.115
Given the option, several counties expressed a desire to opt-out.116 As late
as August 2010, ICE and the DOJ asserted that removing a jurisdiction
112
See Shankar Vedantam, Federal Immigration Program Is Applied Inconsistently in Region,
WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2011, 7:28 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011
/02/26 /AR2011022603582.html (noting that an ICE spokesperson indicated that every jurisdiction in
the country would be expected to participate in S-Comm by 2013).
113
A Briefing Guide to the Secure Communities October 2, 2010 “Mandatory Memo”, CTR. FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ET AL., 1 (2012), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/1-9-12-BriefingGuide-Oct-2-Mandatory-Memo.pdf.
114
See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations for 2010: Hearing on Priorities
Enforcing Immigration Law Before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. on Homeland Sec.,
111th Cong. 1238 (2009) (noting that a locality could opt out from Secure Communities program); see
also Newly Released Secure Communities Documents Signal Opening for Local Opt-Out, UNCOVER
THE TRUTH: ICE AND POLICE COLLABORATIONS (Feb. 17, 2011), http://uncoverthetruth.org/featured
/newly-released-secure-communities-documents-signal-opening-for-local-opt-out/ (noting that opt-outs
were available to local authorities).
115
See “Opt Out” Background, supra note 59. This memo states:

[A]lthough the current [Criminal Justice Information Services Division that manages
the IAFIS database] requirement that the [law enforcement authority] perform a
ministerial task may be very minor, and involve no local costs, the Supreme Court in
Printz held that Congress cannot force state officials to even perform “discrete,
ministerial tasks” to implement a federal regulatory program . . . . Therefore, even
though ICE may not truly consider SC a “program” in the same manner as, e.g.,
CAP, a court may find that SC’s infrastructure, purpose, and activities mark it a
program and, thus, could find that ICE cannot compel LEAs to participate.
Id. (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929–30 (1997)).
116
During the summer of 2010, the Washington D.C. City Council persuaded Chief of Police
Lanier to rescind the S-Comm agreement with ICE and withdraw the District of Columbia from the
program. See Letter from Cathy Lanier, Chief of Police, Gov’t of the Dist. of Columbia Metro. Police
Dept., to Phil Mendelson, Chairman, Comm. on Pub. Safety and the Judiciary Council of the Dist. of
Columbia,
(July
22,
2010),
available
at
http://uncoverthetruth.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/07/SUBMITTED _Follow-up_Secure-Communities_07-22-10.pdf (indicating
that the Chief of Police had rescinded the S-Comm agreement and expressing opposition to legislation).
San Francisco, California and Arlington County, Virginia also sought to opt-out, but got caught up in
the agency’s attempt to reverse course. See Memorandum from Barbara M. Donnellan, Cnty. Manager,
Arlington Cnty., to Cnty. Bd. (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://news.arlingtonva.us/releases/arlingtonofficials-meet-with-191775 (noting that Arlington County would remain as a participant in Secure
Communities); Sandip Roy, ICE Comes Clean—S.F., Other Cities Can Opt Out of S-COMM After All,
NEW AM. MEDIA (Sept. 2, 2010), http://newamericamedia.org/2010/09/ice-comes-cleansf-other-citiescan-opt-out-of-s-comm-after-all.php (detailing San Francisco’s vindication at ICE’s acknowledgement
of S-Comm’s voluntariness).
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from Secure Communities deployment was an option, and was
technologically feasible.117 Concerned that an escalating number of
jurisdictions might seek to opt-out, the federal government began a process
of retrenchment that started with an explanation that since memoranda of
agreement were signed at the state level, localities in that state would not
be able to opt-out.118 Unsatisfied with the statewide interpretation, ICE
then suggested a new definition of what opt-out meant. Under the new
interpretation, the jurisdiction opting-out could choose not to receive the
information from the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center, but
fingerprint data would still be shared between the FBI and DHS.119 Then in
October 2010, DHS explained that while they would meet and negotiate
the timing of S-Comm implementation at the local level, the program
ultimately involved information sharing between federal agencies, and
localities did not have an option regarding participation.120
The memorandum reversing course supports the position that the
decision to make S-Comm mandatory was a policy choice as opposed to a
legal directive. The memorandum does not argue that Congress required SComm to be mandatory, but instead argues that it authorizes ICE to make
S-Comm mandatory if it so chooses.121 While the memorandum identifies
three statutes that form the basis of possible mandatory imposition of SComm, none of the statutes mention S-Comm or any of its relevant
components.122 None of the cited authority requires ICE to deny requests to
117
SECURE COMMUNITIES (2011), supra note 103, at 5 (citing SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT,
supra note 14); see also Letter from Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., to Zoe
Lofgren, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. and Int’l Law
(Sept. 7, 2010) (on file with author) (“If a local law enforcement agency chooses not to be activated in
the Secure Communities deployment plan, it will be the responsibility of that agency to notify its local
ICE field office of suspected criminal aliens.”); Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dept. of Justice, to Zoe Lofgren, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees,
Border Sec. and Int’l Law (Sept. 8, 2010) (on file with author) (noting that a local law enforcement
agency can opt out of the Secure Communities program but that it must formally notify ICE and the
appropriate state identification bureau).
118
See RESTORING COMMUNITY, supra note 17, at 25–28, for a detailed exploration of the opt-out
controversy.
119
Vedantam, supra note 112.
120
Id.
121
See id. (“The Memo does not―and cannot―argue that Congress required S-Comm to be
mandatory. Instead, it argues―employing dubious, glib, and shallow legal reasoning―that Congress
authorized ICE to make S-Comm mandatory if it so chose.”).
122
Ramlogan Memo, supra note 111, at 1 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 14616
(2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1722 (2012)). The first, section 534, was enacted in the 1960s and provides the
Attorney General the authority to collect and exchange “criminal identification, crime, and other
records” with “authorized” federal officials. Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 4(c), 80 Stat. 378, 616, (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 534(a)(1)–(2) (1966)) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 534(a)(1), (a)(4) (2006)). The
second, the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact, was enacted in 1998 and establishes a
“cooperative” framework for states and the federal government to exchange criminal history
information for non-criminal justice purposes. Crime Identification Technology Act of 1998, Pub. L.
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opt-out, nor do any of the statutes require that all individual fingerprints be
run through the interoperable system. Reversing its earlier analysis, ICE’s
memorandum concludes that mandatory imposition of S-Comm upon
unwilling jurisdictions likely does not violate the Tenth Amendment.123
This conclusion is directly contrary to the conclusion reached in the earlier
memo by the same office and exposes the reality that there are arguments
on both sides of the Tenth Amendment debate.
III. PROBLEMS WITH SECURE COMMUNITIES AND RESPONSES BY STATES,
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND INDIVIDUALS
Because S-Comm has been operational since 2008 and is now
mandated in all jurisdictions, there is sufficient participation and passage
of time to evaluate the effects that the program is having on state and local
governments and individuals. This Section identifies problems with SComm’s implementation and describes the impact of the program upon
state and local governments and individuals who are swept up in SComm’s reach. As problems are illuminated in various localities and as
individual lives are impacted, state and local governments and individuals,
along with their respective communities, seek to push back. These stories
of resistance conclude this Section.
A. Problems with Secure Communities
The impact S-Comm has on state and local governments, as well as on
individuals, varies. S-Comm has a negative impact upon community trust
in police that leads to an overall decrease in public safety. If community
members perceive the police in the dual role of both a protector of the
community, as well as an enforcer of immigration laws, victims of crime or
witnesses to crimes may be less likely to seek help from law enforcement.
Documented and undocumented immigrants, as well as U.S. citizens with
immigrant family members, are more hesitant to contact the police for
assistance or to report a crime if doing so places family members at risk of
immigration consequences.124 The police’s dual role can have dire
No. 105-251, § 217, 112 Stat. 1870, 1877 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 14616 (2006)). Finally, the
last statute, a provision of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, requires
that DHS and FBI databases be interoperable. Pub. L. No. 107-173, § 202, 116 Stat. 543, 548–50
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1722(a) (2012)).
123
Ramlogan Memo, supra note 111, at 9.
124
SECURE COMMUNITIES (2011), supra note 103, at 4. The report states:
As the Secure Communities program has expanded and rapidly become a leading
method of immigration enforcement, it has exacerbated the problems of mingling
immigration and local law enforcement. It has also generated enormous controversy
among municipal, county, and state elected officials, members of Congress, and the
public. A particularly intractable problem with the Secure Communities program is
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consequences for victims of domestic violence. Depending upon the
jurisdiction, victims may be arrested in the context of a domestic violence
incident either because of mandatory arrest policies or actions taken in
self-defense.125
If victims of crime, particularly of domestic violence, fail to seek
police protection for fear that they, or their family, will be caught up in SComm and placed in removal proceedings,126 the effectiveness of the
police function will decrease.127 When decreased effectiveness is combined
with the fact that spending time on immigration enforcement in a world of
limited resources means that there are less resources to spend on general
policing the police department’s ability to protect the public safety
decreases even further.128
The ever-expanding use of immigration detainers129 greatly impacts the
criminal justice system.130 Detainers limit the subject’s rights throughout
the entire criminal justice process, effectively creating a second tier of the
criminal justice system for non-citizens.131 On its face, S-Comm’s
its negative impact on community trust in police. Victims of crime, particularly of
domestic violence, have called for police protection only to find themselves in
removal proceedings as a result of Secure Communities. Legal and illegal
immigrants, as well as U.S. Citizens with immigrant family members, are much
more hesitant to contact the police to seek assistance or report a crime when it may
put them or their family at risk. This makes it more difficult for police to solve
crimes and decreases public safety for everyone.
Id. (citation omitted).
125
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 466-38B (2013) (mandating the arrest of anyone suspected of
family violence, which can include the victim).
126
See id. (reporting on domestic violence).
127
See Albert Sabaté, TRUST Act Moves Forward and Could ‘Force’ Fed’s Hand on
Immigration, FUSION (April 10, 2013, 3:41 PM), http://fusion.net/abc_univision/news/story/trust-actmoves-forward-california-copied-connecticut-florida-18293#.UeVh2-DR3ww (describing the story of
Jirayut Latthivongskorn, an undocumented immigrant who was robbed at gunpoint outside of his
apartment when he was a student at U.C. Berkeley but did not report the crime out of fear of coming
into contact with police).
128
See Edgar Aguilasocho et al., Misplaced Priorities: The Failure of Secure Communities in Los
Angeles County 15 (U.C. Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2013-118, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2012283 (“Moreover, the increase in deportation
rates through Secure Communities has had the unintended consequence of decreasing public safety:
immigration duties drain police time and resources, and local immigration enforcement undermines
police-community relationships and discourages crime reporting.”).
129
“An immigration detainer is a piece of paper issued by immigration officials that purports to
command other law enforcement officials to maintain in their custody a prisoner who otherwise would
be released, and deliver that person to federal immigration officials.” Christopher Lasch, Federal
Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United States, 46 LOYOLA L. REV. 4–5 (2013).
130
SECURE COMMUNITIES (2011), supra note 103, at 5 (“The increased use of immigration
detainers has resulted in widespread violations of legal rights, as well as heavy costs to local budgets
that pay for the increased custody of noncitizens who are held for ICE.” (citing Immigrants Behind
Bars, supra note 19)).
131
See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ET AL, COMMENTS ON U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT DRAFT DETAINER POLICY 10–12 (2010), available at http://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/
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exchange of fingerprints should not itself impact the due process rights of
individuals who end up in immigration proceedings.132 However, since the
program was implemented, the number of individuals entering deportation
proceedings has dramatically increased133 and what little evidence exists as
to what happens to these individuals once in ICE custody is troubling.134
Despite the fact that deportation is at issue for individuals apprehended and
detained under S-Comm, not all detainees have access to an immigration
judge.135 A greater percentage of individuals apprehended through SComm (83%) were booked into an ICE detention facility compared with
(62%) for all DHS immigration apprehensions.136 Immigration detention is
similar to criminal incarceration but detainees are not provided lawyers,137
many of them are denied bond,138 and many of them are not guaranteed a
trial in the venue where they were arrested.139 Given the large number of
individuals swept up under the S-Comm program with little procedure or
due process protections, the commission of policing errors is more
destructive and costly.140
Another problem stems from the complex nature of immigration law
and the lack of a clearly defined role for state and local governments. The
rapid expansion of S-Comm has led to confusion and misunderstanding on
the part of local officials who at times overreach.141 In 2007, the Office of
Inspector General did a survey and found a “widespread willingness to

files/NGO%20Detainer%20Comments%20Final%2010%2001%202010.pdf (describing how detainer
practices violate due process rights).
132
Kohli et al., supra note 70, at 6.
133
See Janet Napolitano, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Remarks at American University on
Smart Effective Border Security and Immigration Enforcement (Oct. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/20111005-napolitano-remarks-border-strategy-and-immigrationenforcement.shtm (discussing the “record-breaking enforcement” that has coincided with the
implementation of the S-Comm program).
134
See Kohli et al., supra note 70, at 6 (“[L]ittle is known about what happens to these individuals
once they are in ICE custody.”).
135
See id. at 7 fig.1 (finding that only 52% of people identified through S-Comm had the
opportunity to appear before an immigration judge following their S-Comm apprehension).
136
Id. at 7 n.73.
137
Id. at 7.
138
Id.
139
See id. at 7, 12 fig.9 (finding that only 2% of individuals arrested under Secure Communities
were granted relief from deportation while 63% were removed or ordered to be removed).
140
See, e.g., id. at 6–8 (discussing reasons that the lack of due process in immigration proceedings
is more destructive to than its criminal counterpart).
141
See SECURE COMMUNITIES (2011), supra note 103, at 4 (“As the Secure Communities program
has expanded and rapidly become a leading method of immigration enforcement, it has exacerbated the
problems of mingling immigration and local law enforcement.”). One local sheriff initially thought that
illegal immigrants were felons who must be turned over to the DHS until he learned that immigration
violations were only civil offenses. Id. The sheriff then started looking into how many people in his
community were being deported before trial and he “became very uncomfortable contacting ICE for
nonviolent offenders.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
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142

accept detainers from ICE.” Construing their role as broader than it is
and acting as immigration enforcement officers not only creates problems
for local law enforcement but also leads to mistrust by community
members.143
State and local governments are impacted by increased economic
costs.144 Local law enforcement budgets increase as a result of the rise in
number of non-citizens held in custody on ICE detainers.145 Because of
specific limitations on which detainees state and local governments are
eligible to claim reimbursement for, the federal government ends up
reimbursing local governments for only a tiny fraction of the costs of
detention.146 In addition to the direct costs, state and local governments
may also incur indirect costs associated with litigation resulting from
claims for unlawful detention147 and with the administration of foster care
programs for American children whose parents are deported.148
For state and local governments that do not support S-Comm, the
program requires that the state advance federal policies that the state or its
constituents may deem objectionable.149 By placing state and local officials
on the front line of immigration enforcement on behalf of the federal
government, the lines of political accountability become blurred. State and
local officials might be unfairly blamed for providing information to
federal officials and perceived as supporting federal immigration policy. In
order to counteract this perception, some state and local governments in
this position have adopted sanctuary policies that prohibit local officials
142
AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT NO. 07-07, COOPERATION OF SCAAP
RECIPIENTS IN THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES 15 (2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/OJP/a0707/final.pdf (“Ninety–four of the 99 [jurisdictions
responding] reported that they accept such detainers and the 3 that responded negatively added
comments indicating that they may have misinterpreted the question as asking about the lodging of ICE
prisoners.”).
143
See Aguilasocho et al., supra note 128, at 16 (noting that S-Comm “discourages immigrant
communities from interacting with local police because of [the immigrants’] fear of deportation”).
144
See id. at 15 (discussing the different costs local governments incur due to the implementation
of the S-Comm program).
145
See id. (discussing the budget strains local communities face due to the high cost of
compliance with the S-Comm program).
146
See id. (finding that the federal government only reimburses local governments for the costs of
jailing certain criminal aliens for four or more consecutive days leaving local governments to cover the
remaining costs).
147
See id. (stating that local law enforcement agencies incur “costs associated with compensating
victims of civil rights violations” as a result of their compliance with the S-Comm program).
148
See APPLIED RES. CTR., supra note 27, at 6 (finding that nationally at least 5,100 children
currently live in foster care due to the deportation of their parents and estimating that based on current
detention and deportation rates, the number will grow to 15,000 in the next five years). See also Nina
Rabin, Disappearing Parents: Immigration Enforcement and the Child Welfare System, 44 CONN. L.
REV. 99, 134–35 (2011) (discussing “systematic weaknesses [in] the child welfare system”).
149
See Aguilasocho et al., supra note 128, at 4–5 (discussing the idea that communities may not
“opt-out” of the S-Comm program).
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from providing information on immigration or other city services that
would assist ICE in tracking down, detaining, and deporting suspected
undocumented aliens.150
Individuals are impacted by S-Comm most significantly through the
overbroad nature of the information sharing and the potential in the system
for biased and discriminatory police practices.151 Because the FBI shares
all fingerprints with DHS, U.S. citizen and lawful permanent resident
fingerprints, as well as the fingerprints of individuals with minor criminal
histories, are shared with ICE.152 In an analysis of S-Comm data as of
2011, it was found that 1.6% of cases analyzed were U.S. citizens and all
were apprehended by ICE, which, when extrapolated, leads to the
conclusion that approximately 3,600 U.S. citizens were apprehended by
ICE between 2008 and April of 2011.153
The composition data of those arrested, booked into jails, and then
screened through S-Comm evidences a pattern of biased or discriminatory
police practices.154 The data indicates that 93% of the people identified for
deportation through S-Comm are from Latin-American countries, while the
data on foreign-born persons in the U.S. indicates that 53%, or 77% if the
unauthorized population is counted, are from Latin America.155 By either
number, the overwhelmingly large number of Latin-Americans identified
150
A variety of scholars have provided information about sanctuary cities. See, e.g., Orde F.
Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449,
1455 (2006) (discussing different ways from which local authorities are precluded from actions that
could contribute to the deportation of “unauthorized aliens”); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right
Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373,
1382–91 (2006) (discussing the sanctuary movement of the 1980s and the post-9/11 sanctuary
resurgence); Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 148 (2008)
(discussing New York City and Takoma Park, Maryland as two cities with a “non-cooperation”
sanctuary policy).
151
See BRIEFING GUIDE, supra note 18, at 3 (“[P]reliminary data suggests . . . S-Comm facilitates
and conceals racial profiling.”); Kohli et al., supra note 70, at 1 (describing how local law enforcement
agencies automatically share data from S-Comm communities with the FBI, who then forwards the
information to DHS).
152
See Kohli et al., supra note 70, at 1–2 (explaining that fingerprint data originating in Secure
Communities is transferred to the FBI, to the DHS, and then to ICE). By ICE’s own acknowledgement,
there might be “IDENT matches, or hits, for US citizens for a number of reasons, including that
naturalization data has not been updated in its databases.” Id. at 4; See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES, IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY MONTHLY
STATISTICS THROUGH APRIL 30, 2011 50 (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/scstats/nationwide_interoperability_stats-fy2011-feb28.pdf (explaining why U.S. citizen fingerprints are
in the IDENT system); see also Nora V. Demleitner, Misguided Prevention: The War on Terrorism as
a War on Immigrant Offenders and Immigration Violators, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 574 (2004)
(indicating that anti-terrorism prosecutions led to the conviction of some U.S. citizens); BRIEFING
GUIDE, supra note 18, at 3 (suggesting that U.S. citizens may end up in the IDENT system as a result
of racial profiling).
153
Kohli et al., supra note 70, at 4.
154
See id. at 5 (“Latinos are disproportionately impacted by Secure Communities.”).
155
Id. at 5–6.
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for deportation through S-Comm raises doubts as to the unbiased nature of
the program’s implementation. Although the program is touted by ICE as
focusing on the removal of dangerous criminal aliens, it has in fact
identified and led to removal proceedings against hundreds of thousands of
non-citizens, a substantial number of whom have no criminal record at all,
or who were simply detained for a traffic infraction or other minor
offense.156 As one report noted, “[a]necdotes about racial profiling,
combined with the massive numbers of arrests for minor traffic offenses,
suggest that ICE’s partnership with local law enforcement agencies has led
to widespread discrimination against Latinos and people suspected of
being in the U.S. unlawfully.”157
B. Stories of Resistance and Defiance
In the face of these problems, state and local governments, as well as
communities speaking on behalf of individuals, stood up in defiance and
sought to resist the implementation of S-Comm.158 In the summer of 2010,
the Washington D.C. city council, with community support, convinced the
Chief of Police to rescind a previously signed agreement with ICE to
implement S-Comm.159 Other local governments, including San Francisco,
California, and Arlington County, Virginia, also decided to opt-out of SComm, but in response, ICE reversed course and denied these communities
the opportunity to opt-out.160
ICE’s pronouncement that the program would be mandatory did not
stop the resistance.161 In early 2011, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus,
the Congressional Progressive Caucus, and the Los Angeles Congressional
Delegation called for a national moratorium on S-Comm.162 U.S.
Representative Zoe Lofgren asked the Inspector General to conduct an
official investigation into “false and misleading statements to local
governments, the public, and Members of Congress in connection with the
deployment of the Secure Communities program.”163
Local and state governments responded in different ways, but all
156
See SECURE COMMUNITIES (2011), supra note 103, at 2 (noting that Secure Communities
targets everyone brought into jail, including those booked for minor offenses and non-citizens with no
convictions on their record).
157
See id. at 4.
158
See id. at 5 (explaining the choice of some state and local governments to opt-out of the SComm program).
159
See id. (indicating that Washington D.C. withdrew from the S-Comm program in 2010).
160
See id. (“But when San Francisco, California, and Arlington County, Virginia, also tried to
take ICE up on the opt-out option, the agency reversed course.”) (citation omitted).
161
Marco, Briefing Guide to ICE’s Minor “Secure Communities” Modifications, TURNING THE
TIDE (June 23, 2011), http://altopolimigra.com/2011/06/23/briefing-guide-to-ice%E2%80%99s-minor%E2%80%9Csecure-communities%E2%80%9D-modifications/.
162
Id.
163
Id.
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responses focused on the detainer issue. Localities—including Santa Clara
County, California;164 Alameda County, California;165 Champaign County,
Illinois;166 Cook County, Illinois;167 Milwaukee County, Wisconsin;168 and
Multnomah County, Oregon.169 In addition, towns and cities including
Amherst, Massachusetts; 170 Berkeley, California;171 Chicago, Illinois;172
Los Angeles, California;173 Newark, New Jersey;174 New York, New
York;175 New Orleans, Louisiana;176 San Francisco, California;177 and the
District of Columbia178 passed measures or enacted policies designed to
stymie compliance with immigration detainers. California179 and

164
See SANTA CLARA CNTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS’ POLICY MANUAL, supra note 33 (establishing
a policy honoring ICE detainer requests, but with discretion).
165
See Resolution Regarding Civil Immigration Detainer Requests, Bd. of Supervisors, Res. No.
R-2013 (2010), reprinted in Valle Letter, supra note 34 (declining to enforce ICE detainer requests).
166
See Walsh Letter, supra note 35 (“This office [Champaign County Sherriff’s Office] will not
hold inmates based on a routine detainer.”).
167
COOK CNTY., ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 46-37(a) (2012), available at
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=13805 (“The Sheriff of Cook County shall decline
ICE detainer requests unless there is a written agreement with the federal government by which all
costs incurred by Cook County in complying with the ICE detainer shall be reimbursed.”).
168
Milwaukee Cnty Bd. of Supervisors., Res. 12-135 2012 Bd. (Wis. 2012), available at
http://milwaukeecounty.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1124069&GUID=3D583485-4F014B43-B892-D6FFE5D327BF (establishing a policy with respect to ICE detainer requests).
169
Bd of Cnty. Comm’rs for Multnomah County, Or., Res. 2013-032 (2013), available at
http://web.multco.us/sites/default/files/2013-032.pdf (establishing a policy only recognizing specific
ICE detainer requests).
170
Yoojin Cho, Amherst to opt out of Secure Communities—Resolution to Opt Out of Immigration
Law Passed, WWLP.COM (May 22, 2012), http://www.wwlp.com/news/local/hampshire/amherst-1sttown-to-opt-out-of-secure- communities-law (indicating that Amherst opted out of the S-Comm
program, thus denying enforcement of ICE detainer requests).
171
See ANNOTATED AGENDA, supra note 40, at 6 (showing the adoption of a new policy regarding
immigration detainers in the Berkeley jail system); see also Daniel Letter, supra note 40
(recommending a review of the amended policy on immigration detainers).
172
CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-173-042(a)(1) (2013).
173
See Baca’s Sensible Shift, supra note 42 (discussing the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s decision
not to detain illegal immigrants arrested for minor offenses).
174
See Queally, supra note 43 (discussing Newark’s official decision to opt out of Secure
Communities).
175
N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 9-131(b) (2013).
176
See Robertson, supra note 44, at A10 (detailing New Orleans policy limiting detainer
compliance that “came about for a variety of reasons, including a lawsuit filed in federal court in 2011
by two men who had spent months in Orleans Parish Prison on expired detention requests[]”).
177
See Begin, supra note 46 (describing policy adopted by San Francisco Sheriff Michael
Hennessey).
178
Immigration Detainer Compliance Amendment Act of 2012, D.C. Act 19-442, D.C. CODE
§ 24-211.07 (2012).
179
The California “TRUST (Transparency and Responsibility Using State Tools) Act,” aimed at
limiting the state’s compliance with federal immigration detainers, was signed into law by California’s
governor on October 5, 2013. See Assemb. B. 4, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_4_bill_20130916_enrolled.pdf
(providing that the bill would prohibit law enforcement officers from detaining individuals pursuant to
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180

Connecticut also sought legislative solutions, known as TRUST Acts,181
limiting the obligation of states to comply with federal immigration
detainers. Similar legislation has been proposed in Florida,182
Massachusetts,183 and Washington.184 For example, ordinances in the
District of Columbia, Santa Clara, California, and Cook County, Illinois
declare that their respective law enforcement officers shall not enforce any
immigration detainers without a written agreement from the federal
government promising to pay the full cost of the detainer.185 While in
Chicago, Mayor Rahm Emanuel introduced his “Welcoming City” antidetainer ordinance that bars compliance with detainers, except in cases
involving major crimes, outstanding criminal warrants, or gang
members.186
Individuals, and communities that support these efforts, are also taking
ICE holds when such individuals had only been convicted of committing minor crimes); see also AB-4
State Government, supra note 48 (providing the bill’s history).
180
In June 2013, the Connecticut General Assembly passed, and the governor signed into law, a
bill that will expand the limitations on detainer compliance beyond the Department of Correction to
other state and local law enforcement agencies. H.R. 6659, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2013),
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/act/pa/pdf/2013PA-00155-R00HB-06659-PA.pdf (providing,
in relevant part, that law enforcement officers shall not comply with civil immigration detainers unless
certain conditions are met).
181
Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Understanding Immigration Federalism
in the United States, AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.american progress.org/issues/
immigration/report/2014/03/24/86207/understanding-immigration-federalism-in-the-united-states/
(“California and Connecticut have passed TRUST Acts, which limit state cooperation with federal
immigration officials . . . .”).
182
S.B. 730, 2012–2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013). The bill would have limited detainer
compliance to cases involving specified “serious offense[s].” Id. at 4. It died in committee in May
2013. See SB 730: Federal Immigration Detainer Requests, THE FLA. SENATE, http://www.flsenate
.gov/Session/Bill/2013/0730 (last visited June 25, 2014) (providing the bill’s history and noting that the
bill died in the Senate on May 3, 2013).
183
H.B. 1613, 188th Gen. Court., Reg. Sess. § 10(b)(1) (Mass. 2013). The bill was described as
an “Act relative to restore community trust in Massachusetts law enforcement,” and would severely
restrict state participation in immigration enforcement. Id.
184
H.B. 1874, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(1) (Wash. 2013) (providing that law enforcement officers
shall not detain individuals pursuant to federal immigration detainers where the individuals were
merely convicted for minor offenses).
185
PHIL MENDELSON, CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 19-585,
“IMMIGRATION DETAINER COMPLIANCE AMENDMENT ACT OF 2012” at 6, 11–12 (2012) (noting that
the District of Columbia bill requires Department of Correction holds pursuant to ICE detainers to be
executed only where ICE agreed to reimburse the Department); Santa Clara, Cal., Policy Res. 2011504, 2011 Bd. Of Supervisors (Cal. 2011) (resolving to decline compliance with immigration detainers
unless the federal government agreed to pay the costs of detention, and then only if the prisoner were
convicted of a serious crime and not a juvenile); COOK COUNTY, ILL., CODE § 46-37(a) (2011) (enacted
by Cook County, Ill., Ordinance No. 11-O-73 (2011)).
186
CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 2-173-042(c) (2012). The Mayor claimed that it would “prevent law
abiding Chicagoans from being unfairly detained and deported . . . .” John Presta, Mayor Emanuel
Introduces Ordinance to Make Chicago an Immigrant-Friendly City, EXAMINER.COM (July 11, 2012),
http://www.examiner.com/article/mayor-emanuel-aims-to-make-chicago-most-immigrant-friendly-citythe-country (quoting Mayor Emanuel).
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a stand against S-Comm. Advocates for victims of domestic violence and
advocates for U.S. citizen children, who often end up in foster care after
their parents are deported,187 are publicizing the plight of these
communities. And finally, the large numbers of U.S. citizens who are
incorrectly included in ICE’s database are pushing back through
litigation.188
IV. FEDERALISM CONCERNS: THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS THAT SEEK TO DEFY MANDATORY PARTICIPATION
IN SECURE COMMUNITIES
Immigration is among the hotly contested political issues that raise
complex questions about the relationship between state and federal
policies.189 As the federal government appears unable to reach consensus
on immigration reform, states are stepping in to fill the void. While many
states seek to enhance immigration enforcement efforts, others seek to defy
participation in the immigration enforcement regime. This defiance raises
questions regarding the appropriate role of federal, state, and local

187
Dave & Orloff, supra note 28 (finding that, in a survey conducted among Latina immigrants in
the Washington, D.C. area, 83% of battered immigrant women interviewed did not contact law
enforcement about the abuse); Letter from Asian/Pacific Islander Domestic Violence Resource Project,
et al., to Councilmember Phil Mendelson, Chairman, Comm. on Pub. Safety & the Judiciary (Feb. 25,
2010), available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source =web&cd=1&ved
=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dccadv.org%2Fimg%2Ffck%2FSecure%2520Communiti
es%2520letter%2520to%2520Mendelson%25203%252010%252010%2520Letterhead_Logo_FIN.doc
&ei=W6MAVL-bAYymggT6xYLADg&usg=AFQjCNFd MUIKsYUs G9x-yZeqG6NstSLPoQ&sig2
=1ejtGpHbiBkM1bEa5E4juQ&bvm=bv.74115972,d.eXY (arguing that “[t]he Secure Communities
program is just one more . . . barrier for victims in desperate need of assistance,” and arguing that “[t]he
program puts communities at a heightened risk for domestic violence and domestic violence
fatalities”); APPLIED RES. CTR., supra note 27, at 6 (showing that an estimated 5,100 children currently
living in foster care have detained or deported parents and nearly 15,000 more children are expected to
be in the foster care system in the next five years).
188
For example, Makowski v. Holder et al. and the two lawsuits filed on behalf of mentally ill and
wrongfully deported U.S. citizens in the S-Comm data report from Berkley. Complaint at 3–4,
Makowski v. Holder et. al., No. 1:12-cv-05265 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2012), ECF No. 1; Kohli, et. al., supra
note 70, at 5 n.43.
189
As the federal government appears paralyzed, states are stepping in to fill the void on issues
such as: public health insurance, see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606–07
(2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (finding that the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion, that
conditions the continuation of Medicaid funding on a broad extension of program benefits,
unconstitutionally commandeers state governments for a federal purpose); marijuana, see COLO.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, amended by COLO. CONST. amend. LXIV (legalizing marijuana use in
Colorado); marriage, see ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 650-A (2013) (authorizing same-sex marriage by
codifying marriage as “the legally recognized union of 2 people”); and physician-assisted suicide, see
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (West 2012) (permitting physician-assisted suicide by allowing a capable,
terminally ill patient to “make a written request for medication for the purpose of ending his or her life
in a humane and dignified manner”).
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190

governments in federal immigration enforcement.
The appropriate role of local, state, and federal governments in the
context of immigration enforcement depends in part upon the defiance
scheme invoked by state and local governments. At one end of the
continuum, state and local officials could decline to provide the
fingerprints to the FBI from the outset, thus stopping the trigger that
initiates the S-Comm program.191 While there is no legal obligation upon
state and local governments to share fingerprints, no locality has pursued
this option and it is unlikely that any will. The failure to check arrestees’
fingerprints against the FBI crime database risks officer safety and lessens
the ability to identify and detain fugitives who may have fled other
jurisdictions.192
In the middle of the continuum, a number of states and localities have
passed measures providing authority to law enforcement officials to

190
The Tenth Amendment question is sufficiently ambiguous that ICE itself changed its position
with respect to potential Tenth Amendment concerns. When ICE initially launched S-Comm as an optin program, part of the rationale behind voluntary participation was the agency’s own internal analysis
that forced participation might raise Tenth Amendment commandeering concerns:

[Secure Communities’] position that participation in the “Secure Communities
initiative” is voluntary is supported by applicable case-law. Under the Tenth
Amendment, “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to implement,
by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.” Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997). Similarly, “[t]he Federal Government may neither
issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a
federal regulatory program.” Id. at 935. Although SC defines itself as a “plan,”
“strategy,” or “initiative,” and not a “program” . . . in official documents, ICE
created SC to address programmatic changes to the manner in which ICE identifies
and removes criminal aliens, and the public perceives it as an ICE program.
Moreover, although the currently [sic] CJIS requirement that the LEA perform a
ministerial task may be very minor, and involve no local costs, the Supreme Court in
Printz held that Congress cannot force state officials to even perform “discrete,
ministerial tasks” to implement a federal regulatory program. Id. at 929–30.
Therefore, even though ICE may not truly consider SC a “program” . . . a court may
find that SC’s infrastructure, purpose, and activities mark it a program and, thus,
could find that ICE cannot compel LEAs to participate.
“Opt Out” Background, supra note 59 (citations omitted) (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
925, 929–30, 935 (1997)). Then on October 2, 2010, the Deputy Principal Legal Advisor of ICE drafted
a memo reversing that position and finding that participation in Secure Communities can be made
mandatory by 2013 without violating the Tenth Amendment. Ramlogan Memo, supra note 111, at 1.
191
Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology,
Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1126–27 (2013) (explaining that while states are not
required by federal law to submit fingerprints to the FBI, all states voluntarily do).
192
HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TASK FORCE ON
SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (2011) (“[F]rom a practical standpoint,
local police have no choice but to . . . forward[] arrestees’ fingerprints to the FBI in order to obtain
information that is critically important for crime-fighting purposes.”) (emphasis omitted).
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decline to honor immigration detainers issued by ICE. An analysis of the
propriety of this approach initially hinges on the question of whether
immigration detainers constitute federal mandates or merely requests. This
question continues to create confusion, but there are arguments that the
legislative history, statutory and regulatory language, and initial court
decisions, support the conclusion that detainers are requests from ICE to
local law enforcement and local law enforcement can then choose whether
to comply.194 Further, in light of current Tenth Amendment anticommandeering jurisprudence, construing the S-Comm immigration
detainer provision as mandatory creates the very problems—state and local
governments bearing the costs, both direct and indirect, of administering a
federal initiative195 and states and local governments being politically
193

E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282.5 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-192h(b) (2014); CHI.,
ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-173-040 (2014).
194
There is controversy regarding the question of whether immigration detainers are mandatory
orders that states and localities must comply with or if they are requests by ICE that local and state
authorities may decline to enforce. The confusion stems from a convoluted legislative history and
ICE’s own shifting and ambiguous position on the issue. See Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the
Limits of the Executive’s Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164,
165–66 (2008) for a detailed analysis of Congress’s grant of detainer authority to federal immigration
officials and the Executive Branch’s subsequent attempts to expand that authority through regulations.
There is some support for the conclusion that detainers are not mandatory orders, but merely requests
that state and local law enforcement can choose to decline. In addition to the statutory and regulatory
scheme and admission by ICE itself that detainers are merely requests and not orders, courts that have
construed the nature of the detainer have declined to find it to be an order of custody and instead have
found it to be a voluntary request. See United States v. Female Juvenile, A.F.S., 377 F.3d 27, 35 (1st
Cir. 2004) (“[A]n INS detainer is not, standing alone, an order of custody. Rather, it serves as a request
that another law enforcement agency notify the INS before releasing an alien from detention so that the
INS may arrange to assume custody over the alien.”); Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 F. Supp. 2d
905, 911 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (“A detainer is not a criminal warrant, but rather a voluntary request . . . .”);
State v. Montes-Mata, 208 P.3d 770, 771 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that an immigration detainer
“merely expressed ICE’s intention to seek future custody of Montes-Mata and requested that Lyon
County provide notice to ICE before terminating his confinement.”). But see Lasch, Preempting
Immigration, supra note 9, at 330–31 (arguing that states and localities may not have discretion over
immigration detainers).
195
See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2006) (“Upon a determination by the Department to issue a detainer
for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of
the alien for a period not to exceed forty-eight hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in
order to permit assumption of custody by the Department.”). In addition to the costs of paying for this
additional incarceration, there are administrative resources involved in receiving, maintaining, and
effectuating these requests. See BRIEFING GUIDE, supra note 18, at 2–3 (finding previously unreleased
correspondence between local law enforcement officials in Florida that indicate the administration of
the program does present costs in addition to the extended detention). Pursuant to implementation of
Secure Communities, the costs to state and local officials are greater than mere dollars. There is the
indirect increase in local costs due to the impact that immigration detainers have on bail and post
conviction decisions. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, ISSUE BRIEF: IMMIGRATION DETAINERS AND
LOCAL DISCRETION 5 (2011), https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/detainers_issue_brief.pdf
(supporting the finding that average incarceration periods for individuals with detainers is significantly
longer than for those without immigration detainers, and the issuance of an immigration detainer
prevents individuals from being able to post bail, and having access to rehabilitative programs and
other alternatives to incarceration). S-Comm can also influence police practices in the field as

2014]

HANDS OFF OUR FINGERPRINTS

137
196

accountable for a federally created initiative —that the anticommandeering provision was designed to protect against.
At the other end of the continuum, and the focus of this Section, is the
argument that no state or locality has yet advanced—namely, that the
forced sharing of state or local government information in the form of
citizens’ fingerprints runs afoul of the anti-commandeering concepts of the
Tenth Amendment. States or localities could test the contours of the Tenth
Amendment protections by drafting legislation expressly stating that state
and local resources, in the form of police work resulting in fingerprint
gathering, cannot be used for immigration enforcement purposes.
Alternatively, state and local governments could condition the sharing of
fingerprints on an express condition that the federal government not violate
the Federal Privacy Act when sharing the state and locally supplied
fingerprints. This Section will examine whether states and localities have
immigration screening programs in local jails can lead to racial profiling and increased arrests of
persons perceived to be undocumented immigrants. Id. States and localities can also experience an
increase in legal costs where local agencies knowingly or unknowingly violate federal laws regarding
immigration detainers. This liability can take many forms including holding an immigrant in excess of
the forty-eight hour limit, honoring wrongfully issued detainers and due process concerns due to failure
to provide adequate notice. E.g., Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Monetary
Damages, Morales v. Chadbourne, C.A. No. 12-301 M (D.R.I. Apr. 24, 2012) (citing federal
regulations preventing law enforcement officers from detaining an alien for more than forty-eight
hours); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Monetary Damages, Uroza v. Salt
Lake Cnty., No. 11-0713, (D. Utah Mar. 26, 2012) (alleging that law enforcement officials deprived an
alien of due process and violated federal regulations by detaining him for twenty-four hours even after
he posted bail); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, Brizuela v. Feliciano, No. 3:12-cv-00226-JBA (D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2012) (alleging that the
petitioner’s due process rights were violated because he was not able to challenge his detainment by
immigration officials); Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Jimenez Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 1:11-cv-05452, (N.D. Ill., Aug. 11, 2011) (alleging that
the issuance of immigration detainers without a notice requirement violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment); Complaint, Galarza v. Szalczyk, No. 510CV06815 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2010)
(alleging that ICE and local police unlawfully detained the petitioner). Further, public safety can also
be impacted as undocumented immigrants who are either the victims of or witnesses to crimes are
discouraged from reporting to local police who they perceive to be immigration enforcers. See Kittrie,
supra note 150, at 1476–77 (“Deportation of unauthorized aliens who report crimes to the police is
described as harming relations between the police and those citizens and legal aliens who may be
family members or associates of the deported alien.” (citation omitted)); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The
Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 604 (2008) (suggesting
that local sanctuary laws can increase cooperation between immigrant populations and the police to
help provide police information they need to effectively do their jobs).
196
There are political costs associated with mandated compliance with S-Comm. State and local
governments that fully participate in the S-Comm program are forced to support a federal program and
policy that they and their constituents may oppose. In the immigration context, this concern is evident
in earlier efforts by local governments to adopt sanctuary policies that prohibit local officials from
providing information about immigration status that would assist ICE in identifying, detaining and
eventually deporting suspected undocumented immigrants. See Rodriguez, supra note 195, at 600–05
(providing an overview of the sanctuary law movement). If the community views state and local law
enforcement as arms of federal immigration enforcement then state and local governments will be in
the position of having to defend the program and take blame for its potential defects. See Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997) (finding it problematic that the sheriffs in Printz were “put in
the position of taking the blame for [the program’s] burdensomeness and its defects”).
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the legal authority to decline participation in S-Comm by passing laws that
hinder the federal government’s ability to share citizens’ fingerprints with
ICE that state and local governments obtain in the ordinary course of
policing.
“The Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers,”197
and ratification of the Tenth Amendment made express what the
enumeration of powers implied: “[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”198 Despite this explicit mandate, ascertaining the
constitutionally permissible line in the context of an actual controversy can
be difficult. The complex questions of balancing authority can be
examined in two ways. Inquiry can focus on whether an act of Congress is
authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of the
Constitution199 or whether an act of Congress invades the province of state
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment.200 Each position is the flip
side of the other, implicating identical concerns of federalism and the
rights of the states.201
197

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
U.S. CONST., amend. X. For a discussion of another potential Tenth Amendment claim not
addressed in this Article, “that the Tenth Amendment immunizes essential state governmental
functions—in this case, the keeping of confidential records by state agencies—from any federal
regulation,” see Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets From the Federal Government?, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 103, 135–37 (2012). Mikos goes on to find that “[t]he . . . claim that the Tenth Amendment
insulates state functions from federal regulation altogether has been discredited since Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority overruled National League of Cities v. Usery.” Id. at 135
(citation omitted). The Court in Garcia rejected “as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice”
the rule articulated in National League of Cities that turned on judicial appraisal of whether a particular
government function is “integral” or “traditional.” Id. (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985)). Since the decision in Garcia, lower courts have dismissed state
Tenth Amendment challenges to demands for state records and have relied upon the Supremacy Clause
to uphold federal demands for a variety of confidential records from states including state juvenile
courts, a state attorney general, state tax agencies, state medical boards, state probation offices, and
other records privileged by state law for use in federal criminal and civil cases. Id. at 135–36.
199
See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 146–57 (1971) (considering whether Congress
had the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate “loan shark[ing]”); M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 331 (1819) (considering whether Congress had the power under the Necessary
and Proper Clause to create a national bank).
200
See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 535–36 (weighing the Tenth Amendment against Congress’s
power to regulate public-mass transit systems); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 75–81
(1869) (explaining the relationship of power between the States and Federal Government).
201
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155–56 (1992) (citing United States v. Oregon,
366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961)) (stating that if a power is expressly delegated to Congress it is no longer a
power reserved to the States, and “if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress”); Case v.
Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946) (stating that Congress has the power “to accomplish the full purpose
of a granted authority” as long as it does not act in a manner inconsistent with other parts of the
Constitution); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941) (explaining
that if powers are delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment does not reserve
that power to the States and if a power is one of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment
198
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In this system of dual sovereignty, both the national and state
governments have elements of sovereignty that the other is bound to
respect.202 Given this concurrent sovereign framework, it is inevitable that
laws may at times conflict with or undermine others. When a conflict
exists, the Constitution makes clear, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause,
that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”203 Pursuant to the concept of
supremacy, Congress has the power to preempt state law.204
S-Comm raises fundamental questions of whether the federal
government’s implementation of the program can disempower state and
local policing efforts. On the one hand, state and local governments are
afforded general police powers to regulate behavior and enforce laws for
health, safety, and general welfare.205 On the other hand, the federal
government has plenary power over immigration that includes the ability to
determine and enforce who is eligible to remain in the U.S. and who is
not.206 In the context of S-Comm, these two purposes may be in conflict. It
is unclear where the appropriate balance of power should lie.

then the Constitution has not conferred it upon Congress). State sovereignty and concepts of federalism
are designed to protect citizens by diffusing sovereign power and by moving governance decisions
away from the federal level and bringing them closer to the people who are governed. New York, 505
U.S. at 181–82; THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 316–18 (James Madison) (Tudor Publishing Co. ed.,
1947).
202
See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(highlighting the structure of the system of dual sovereignty); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457 (1991) (stating
that the Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty whereby states possess sovereignty
concurrent with the Federal Government except as limited by the Supremacy Clause).
203
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
204
See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (“A fundamental
principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to preempt state law.”); Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210–11 (1824) (stating that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and
that all inconsistent laws must yield to it).
205
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (“The traditional police power of the States is defined as
the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals, and we have upheld such a basis for
legislation.”).
206
Constitutional sources of Congress’s power to legislate immigration include:
the
Naturalization Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (providing that Congress has the power to establish
a “uniform Rule of Naturalization”); the Commerce Clause, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, (providing that
Congress has the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States”),
the War Power, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (providing that Congress has the power to declare war); Implied
Sovereign Powers, The Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 505
(1889) (stating that the federal government has “power over all the foreign relations of the country,
war, peace and negotiations and intercourse with other nations; all of which are forbidden to the state
governments); and the Foreign Affairs Power, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713
(1893) (stating that Congress has the power to exclude or expel aliens because it is a power affecting
international relations).
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In Printz v. United States the Supreme Court held that the anticommandeering principles mandated by the Tenth Amendment prohibit the
federal government from commandeering state and local governments’
resources to enact federally created regulatory programs and enforce
federal regulatory schemes.208 As interpreted through Supreme Court
precedent, “[t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program.”209
Unlike the mandatory detainer example, where the costs are direct and
obvious, the constitutional analysis is less clear if states and localities seek
to prohibit the FBI from sharing fingerprint information that they collect
through local law enforcement efforts with ICE. In this context, state and
local governments investigate, collect, assemble, and share information
that they obtain as part of their policing function. Localities deploy
resources to effectively collect this information and rely upon community
trust to be effective.210 The fingerprints are then forwarded by state and
local governments to the FBI in order to further this police purpose namely
to find out if the individual has a criminal background or poses a risk to the
community. If the FBI only used fingerprints for criminal background
checks, the goals of the state and local government and the federal
government would align. However, under S-Comm, the FBI turns the
prints over to the DHS for an entirely different purpose, immigration
enforcement.211 This transformation of purpose creates a tension. State and
local governments share the information with the FBI to enhance their
policing powers. The FBI, pursuant to its plenary power over immigration,
uses the fingerprint information for immigration enforcement purposes and
in so doing not only proceeds without the consent of individuals, but also
undermines the very effort for which the fingerprints were initially
gathered. In the end, the federal government’s use of state and local
information for federal immigration purposes undermines the state and
local governments’ efforts to police their communities effectively.
207

521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 935 (“Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory
program.”).
209
Id. (finding an interim provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that
commanded state and local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks on prospective
handgun purchasers unconstitutional pursuant to the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering rule);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)) (“Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.’”).
210
RESTORING COMMUNITY, supra note 17, at 5–8.
211
Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.
gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Aug 26, 2014).
208
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Under our constitutional system of dual sovereignties, do state and
local governments have the ability to prohibit the federal government from
sharing the fingerprint information that they collected? States and localities
could approach this issue either reactively or proactively. First, state and
local governments could simply argue that the FBI’s indiscriminate sharing
of the fingerprint information violates their Tenth Amendment anticommandeering rights.212 Second, state and local governments could
affirmatively draft legislation expressly stating that state and local
resources, in the form of police work resulting in fingerprint gathering,
cannot be used for immigration enforcement purposes. Alternatively, state
and local governments could condition the sharing of fingerprints on an
express condition that the federal government not violate the Federal
Privacy Act by sharing the fingerprints.213
Pursuant to Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering principles, the
federal government does not have the power to force the state or local
governments to enforce a federal regulatory scheme.214 Does the FBI’s
sharing of fingerprint information force state and local governments to
enforce federal immigration regulation? If one relies exclusively upon
lower court opinions on this question, the current answer would likely be
no.215 Professor Mikos has categorized lower court decisions in this area
and found that lower courts have consistently upheld information sharing
between state and local governments and the federal government on the
grounds that information sharing is different from other problematic
commandeering in two respects.216 First, some courts find that providing
information about violations of federal law does not amount to assisting in
the administration or enforcement of federal law.217 These courts

212

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Privacy Act § 3418, Pub. L. No. 93-579, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY
ACT OF 1974, at 16–17, available at www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LH_privacy_act-1974.pdf
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
214
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“Congress cannot compel the States to enact
or enforce a federal regulatory program.”).
215
This may be changing as a recent Supreme Court anti-commandeering case saw seven of the
Justices join on the controlling reasoning. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2666–67 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, J., dissenting) (“Seven Members of the Court agree that
the Medicaid Expansion, as enacted by Congress, is unconstitutional.”).
216
Mikos, supra note 198, at 139–44.
217
See, e.g., Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc. (Freilich II), 313 F.3d 205, 214 (4th Cir.
2002) (finding that a requirement to submit reports to the Board of Medical Examiners is insufficient to
“offend” the Tenth Amendment); City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 34–35 (2d Cir.
1999) (rejecting the city’s claim that congressional statutes had commandeered a city official into
providing immigration data to the federal law enforcement agencies by relying upon a distinction in
Printz between federal demands for state information and federal directives to participate in a
regulatory program); United States v. Brown, No. 07 Cr. 485(HB), 2007 WL 4372829, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 12, 2007), aff’d 328 F. App’x 57 (2d Cir. 2009); Freilich v. Bd. of Dirs. of Upper Chesapeake
213

142

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:101

distinguish between simply sharing information about federally regulated
activities and actively bearing some administrative burden, finding that
simply sharing information does not amount to enforcing federal law.218
Second, other courts argue that demands for information alone do not
implicate the important structural harms at the core of the Tenth
Amendment’s anti-commandeering inquiry—namely, economic and
political costs that commandeering imposes upon the states.219 These lower
courts found that sharing information was not a burden in the same way220
because the federal government is demanding that states provide
information that they already have and as such does not require the
allocation of additional resources.221 In cases where courts acknowledge
the nuanced costs of sharing information, the courts still conclude that
whatever minimal costs that do exist for states and localities are
outweighed by the federal government’s interest in obtaining

Health, Inc. (Freilich I), 142 F. Supp. 2d 679, 694–96 (D. Md. 2001) (finding the federal requirement
to be constitutional), aff’d sub nom. Freilich II, 313 F.3d 205.
218
This distinction grew from a portion of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in the Printz case in
which he distinguished between statutes “which require only the provision of information to the
Federal Government” and those that force participation of the States’ executives in the actual
administration of a federal program. Printz, 521 U.S. at 918. For examples of this distinction, see
Freilich I, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 697 (“The federal government has not compelled the states to enact or
enforce a federal regulatory program—rather, the government is asking the states to provide
information regarding their own state administered regulatory programs. This has never been held to
violate the Tenth Amendment.”) and Brown, 2007 WL 4372829, at *6 (“[T]he Act only requires states
to provide information rather than administer or enforce a federal program.”); Freilich I, 142 F. Supp.
2d at 697 (“The federal government has not compelled the states to enact or enforce a federal
regulatory program—rather, the government is asking the states to provide information regarding their
own state administered regulatory programs. This has never been held to violate the Tenth
Amendment.”).
219
Mikos, supra note 198, at 140.
220
See In re Special Apr. 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 1978) (denying a motion
to quash or modify grand jury subpoenas duces tecum served on five members of an Illinois state
official’s staff); In re Grand Jury Subpoena for N.Y. State Income Tax Records, 468 F. Supp. 575, 577
(N.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding that a grand jury subpoena did not constitute a “proper judicial order” within
the meaning of a New York statute making it unlawful to divulge information disclosed in tax returns
except in accordance with proper judicial order, but nevertheless, compliance with a federal grand jury
subpoena was mandated by the supremacy clause of United States Constitution).
221
Mikos, supra note 198, at 141 (“In economic terms, the information sought is a nonrivalrous
public good. The federal government’s use of the information does not detract from the state’s use of
it.”). For arguments by scholars who support this view, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty”
Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 933–34 (1998) (arguing that information sharing should be exempted
from the anti-commandeering rule), and Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:
Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2253–54 (1998) (arguing that “relatively minor
recordkeeping, record-checking, or information-providing” are distinguishable from “more substantial
imposition on state resources involving matters that . . . come close to the core of legislative
responsibilities.”).
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222

information.
Despite these lower court opinions, Professor Mikos persuasively
argues that the distinction that these courts draw between demands for
information and demands for other types of administrative services has no
obvious basis, and are formally and functionally indistinguishable from
other forms of prohibited commandeering.223 If one were to follow the
logic of the rule set forth in Printz v. United States, commandeering
information by either compelled gathering or compelled reporting would
violate the anti-commandeering rule.224
In the context of the S-Comm program, it is arguable that not only is
the bright line anti-commandeering rule offended, but also the underlying
premise for the rule, that states and localities will bear the real and political
costs associated with effectuating a federal program, is offended. The costs
of sharing information, while less direct, are no less real than the costs
associated with complying with ICE issued detainers. Knowing that local
law enforcement will share information with federal immigration
enforcement officials will decrease the willingness of undocumented
immigrants to report crimes either as witnesses or victims.225 If those
222
See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31–32, 34–35 (2d Cir. 1999) (challenging
provisions that gave the INS access to confidential state records concerning the immigration status of
residents and applying a balancing test pitting the city’s interest in confidentiality against the federal
government’s apparent need for the information).
223
Mikos, supra note 198, at 107–08. He negates this relied upon distinction as a descriptive
matter, and as a matter of precedent, history, and underlying purpose of the anti-commandeering rule.
Descriptively, he argues that the majority of what law enforcement agents do is to gather and report
information about regulated activities. Id. at 39. As a matter of precedent, the distinction violates the
very holding in the Supreme Court’s seminal anti-commandeering case, Printz, which found that a
regulatory program imposed upon the state that required searching and analyzing state criminal records
databases to determine if a prospective gun purchaser was barred from making the purchase under
federal law violated the anti-commandeering rule. Id. at 140–43. Despite the fact that this did not
amount to a great burden and that it required the sharing of information, the court found that
commandeering is prohibited no matter how insignificant the burden. Id. Historically, the distinction
does not take into account that the methods now used to commandeer state secrets were unknown to the
framers and only relatively recently developed. And finally, reliance upon the distinction makes state
and local law enforcement official tools of federal law enforcement, the very harm the anticommandeering rule was intended to address. Id. at 144. In addition to the flaws identified above, he
argues more fundamentally that allowing states to keep information from the federal government
allows states to engage in passive resistance by refusing to participate in federal programs that they
chose to defy. Id. at 137–44.
224
Anthony Johnstone, Commandeering Information (and Informing the Commandeered), 161 U.
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 205, 208 (2013), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online205.pdf; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932–33 (1997) (adopting a bright line rule as
opposed to a balancing test).
225
See Kittrie, supra note 150, at 1476–77 (“Deportation of unauthorized aliens who report
crimes to the police is described as harming relations between the police and those citizens and legal
aliens who may be family members or associates of the deported alien.”); Rodriguez, supra note 195, at
604 (suggesting that local sanctuary laws can increase cooperation between immigrant populations and
the police to help provide police with the information that they need to do their jobs effectively).
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closest to the community do not produce information for law enforcement,
law enforcement will be less effective and will have to get the information
from other sources increasing their overall costs. However, the argument is
not as clear as it is when local law enforcement directly allocates resources
to effectuate a federal mandate. In the context of the S-Comm program,
there are two potential counter arguments. First, the causal connection is
more attenuated because whether to report is the witness’ or victim’s
choice as opposed to the local law enforcement official. Second, witnessreported crimes represent only a subset of cases. Arrests made as a result of
traffic stops or police observation are not likely to be impacted because of
the potential immigration consequences, at least not in a way that would
limit the arrests.
Politically, if local government is seen as the enforcement arm of the
federal immigration system, states and localities will be blamed for
problems and will be seen as complicit in a system that the local
community may oppose. While the fingerprint information collected by
local law enforcement is collected for the purpose of running a criminal
background check, once the FBI shares this information with DHS, the
purpose for which the information was originally shared changes and local
law enforcement will be viewed as complicit in the immigration
enforcement process. These are the very costs that the anti-commandeering
rule is designed to avoid and they are no less real simply because they stem
from information sharing as opposed to other forms of administrative
assistance. Thus, the requirement that states and localities participate in a
federal immigration enforcement scheme that utilizes fingerprints collected
with state and local law enforcement resources and then indiscriminately
turns them over to ICE for immigration purposes arguably infringes upon
the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment.
A second approach would be for state and local governments to draft
legislation expressly stating that state and local resources, in the form of
police work resulting in fingerprint gathering, cannot be used for
immigration enforcement purposes. Alternatively, state and local
governments could condition the sharing of fingerprints on an express
condition that the federal government not violate the Federal Privacy Act
in sharing the state and locally supplied fingerprints.226 This approach is
more complex and raises express and conflict preemption concerns. The
federal government has broad powers over immigration and the Supremacy
Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state law either through

226
For an interesting and comprehensive analysis of data control and privacy theory, see Kalhan,
supra note 191, at 1146–51 (arguing that there is a tension between the longstanding view that the FBI
does not own the fingerprint records it collects and is not in a position to alter those records and the
principle of free information sharing with the DHS).
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express preemption, field preemption, or conflict preemption. Field
preemption can occur in two ways. First, Congress may indicate its
intention to replace state law entirely by implementing a “framework of
regulation ‘so pervasive . . . that Congress [leaves] no room for the States
to supplement it.’”230 Alternatively, a “federal interest [can be] . . . so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject.”231 Conflict preemption can also occur in
two ways. There can be an actual conflict where compliance with both
federal and state laws are physically impossible. Or, the challenged state
law “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”232 If the state statute is found to be
an obstacle to the federal law, then preemption will invalidate the state
statute. Any attempt by state and local government to enact a prohibition of
federal information sharing will need to address preemption arguments.
In 1996, Congress passed two pieces of legislation that limit
government agencies from prohibiting the sharing of information to or
from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (ICE’s predecessor
agency).233 The legislative provisions state that “a Federal, State, or local
government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any
government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the
citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”234
227
A statute may contain an express preemption provision. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of
U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977 (2011) (“[The Immigration Reform and Control Act expressly
preempts States from imposing ‘civil or criminal sanctions’ on those who employ unauthorized
aliens.”).
228
States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determined must be
regulated by its exclusive governance. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 115
(1992) (Souter, J., dissenting). Intent can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . .
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or where a “federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
229
State laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law, including when they stand “as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
230
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
231
Id. at 2501 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; English v. Gen. Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79).
232
Id. (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000); Hines, 312 U.S.
52 at 67; Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373).
233
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Personal Responsibility and
Worker Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C, 8 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
234
8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012). Section 1373 also specifies that “no person or agency may prohibit,
or in any way restrict, a Federal, state or local government entity” from “maintaining” or
“exchanging . . . with any other Federal, State, or local government entity” information regarding any
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Additionally, S-Comm was created pursuant to a provision of the
Enhanced Border Security Act, requiring the federal government to create
an interoperable system to share information between ICE and the FBI or
other federal agencies.235 As originally conceived, Congress intended ICE
to have access to the FBI’s records when confronted with an immigration
enforcement decision against an individual.236 Pursuant to original SComm implementation, the DHS would place images for individuals they
deemed “‘high priority’ subjects” into a database accessible to the FBI237
This discriminate sharing protocol changed and the federal government
implemented indiscriminate bi-directional sharing of information between
the FBI and ICE.238
If state and local governments pass legislation prohibiting the FBI
from sharing fingerprints with ICE for immigration screening purposes, the
federal government could argue that such a provision was expressly
preempted. However, states and localities could argue that since the
information of all arrested individuals is shared from the FBI to ICE the
purpose of the sharing is overbroad and not limited to sharing for
immigration purposes. Thus, the federal government cannot have it both
ways. The federal government could narrow its information sharing
processes by returning to the original S-Comm protocol where the DHS
person’s “immigration status, lawful or unlawful.” 8 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (2012). And the section of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act entitled “Communication between
State and local government agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service” is essentially
repetitive of parts of IIRIRA’s section 1373. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1644 (2012). This provisions states that
“no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or
receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration
status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1644 (2012)). Neither
section 1373 of the IIRIRA nor section 1644 of PWORA specifies a sanction for a violation. See 8
U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1644 (2012) (discussing communication between government agencies and
Immigration and Naturalization Services without mentioning sanctions).
235
8 U.S.C. § 1721 (2012).
236
See 8 U.S.C. § 1722(a)(2) (2012) (instructing the President to develop and implement an
interoperable electronic data system to provide current and immediate access to information); 147
Cong. Rec. S12247 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), (discussing the creation of
an electronic data system to enhance decision making regarding the visa screening process); 147 CONG.
REC. H10465 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2001) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (discussing the
establishment of a Commission on Interoperable Data Sharing) 148 CONG. REC. H2137 (daily ed. May
7, 2002) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner), (discussing the “Chimera system,” an interoperable
electronic data system).
237
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVICES DIV., AND THE DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFFAIRS FOR IMPROVED INFO. SHARING SERVICES 5 (2008), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/dhsfbiinteroperabilitymoujuly2008.pdf.
238
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE INTERIM DATA
SHARING MODEL (IDSM) FOR THE AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
(IDENT)/INTEGRATED
AUTOMATED
FINGERPRINT
IDENTIFICATION
SYSTEM
(IAFIS)
INTEROPERABILITY PROJECT 3 (2006), available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy
/privacy_pia_usvisit_idsm.pdf.
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only sought fingerprints from the FBI to determine the admissibility or
deportability of specific aliens. In the context of a more limited exchange
of information, the express preemption argument might be stronger. If the
federal government continues with the indiscriminate and automatic
sharing of information, the argument that the state or local government is
preempted is not as strong.
The federal government could also argue that the state or local
ordinance could be struck down on the grounds of obstacle preemption.
The question for the courts would be whether “the challenged state law
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress . . . .’”239 Pursuant to the federal
government’s revised and indiscriminate sharing approach, a state or local
ordinance that prohibits the sharing of fingerprints could be viewed as an
obstacle to the federal government’s interpreted rights under the mandate
for an interoperable sharing system.
State and local governments that do not want to engage in cooperative
immigration enforcement can argue that the forced sharing of fingerprint
information that state and local governments collect through the allocation
of their own resources violates Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering
principles. State and local governments can also act more affirmatively and
draft legislation expressly stating that state and local resources, in the form
of police work resulting in fingerprint gathering, cannot be used for
immigration enforcement purposes. Alternatively, state and local
governments could condition the sharing of fingerprints on an express
condition that the federal government not violate the Federal Privacy Act
in sharing the state and locally supplied fingerprints. However, any state or
local legislative initiatives would be subject to preemption arguments, the
result of which is difficult to predict.
V. INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY CONCERNS: BALANCING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY
EXPECTATIONS AGAINST AGENCY INFORMATION SHARING
While implementation of S-Comm raises federalism concerns for local,
state, and federal governments, individuals are also impacted by questions
of how to balance individual privacy against agency desires to share
information. Pursuant to S-Comm’s current practice,240 the FBI
indiscriminately sends the fingerprints of all arrestees to the DHS prior to
knowing if the fingerprints are those of U.S. citizens, lawful permanent
239
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000)).
240
This Article does not explore the larger questions that are implicated when governments use
remote biometric identification (RBI). For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Laura K. Donohue,
Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes
of Age, 97 MINNESOTA L. REV. 407 (2012).
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residents, immigrants with pending applications for adjustment of status, or
undocumented immigrants.241 Is the FBI permitted to share the fingerprints
of U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, immigrants with applications
pending for adjustment of status, and undocumented immigrants with the
DHS without first obtaining permission from the individuals impacted? Is
there a line beyond which the sharing of information infringes upon
individuals rights to privacy?242 If so, who may avail themselves of
protection? This Section explores the existence of federal statutory
protections for individuals whose fingerprints are unwittingly shared
between the FBI and the DHS and proposes alternatives based upon the
articulated policies behind the Federal Privacy Act.243
In 1974, Congress passed the Federal Privacy Act in an attempt to
comprehensively address the appropriate balance between the
government’s need to effectively and efficiently collect and share
information against individuals’ privacy rights.244 There was growing
concern that in the absence of legislation, the unchecked institutional
interests of the federal government would override individual privacy

241
See Secured Communities, supra note 10 (discussing how “[f]or “decades, local
jurisdictions . . . shared the fingerprints of individuals who [had been] arrested or booked . . . with the
FBI).
242
While beyond the scope of this Article, I acknowledge that there may be constitutional
procedural due process arguments to be made regarding the indiscriminate and overbroad sharing of
fingerprints.
243
This Section is specifically focused on the potential statutory remedy while other scholars have
addressed S-Comm’s implementation through technology, surveillance, and privacy-based frameworks.
See Kalhan, supra note 191, at 1134–51.
244
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(2012)). In the Act, Congress found that:

(1) the privacy of an individual is directly affected by the collection, maintenance,
use, and dissemination of personal information by Federal agencies;
(2) the increasing use of computers and sophisticated information technology, while
essential to the efficient operations of the Government, has greatly magnified the
harm to individual privacy that can occur from any collection, maintenance, use, or
dissemination of personal information;
(3) the opportunities for an individual to secure employment, insurance, and credit,
and his right to due process, and other legal protections are endangered by the
misuse of certain information systems;
(4) the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the
Constitution of the United States; and
(5) in order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information systems
maintained by Federal agencies, it is necessary and proper for the Congress to
regulate the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information by such
agencies.
Id.
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245

interests. In the end, the final version of the Act, resulting from a last
minute compromise between Senate and House bills,246 did adopt a more
conservative approach to protecting individual privacy, providing for
easier access and distribution for the government and less protection for
individual privacy rights.247
Those critical of the legislation found that the bill lacked internal
consistency, clear legislative intent, and rigorous privacy protections.248 As
245
See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 98TH CONG., WHO CARES ABOUT
PRIVACY? OVERSIGHT OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 BY THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
AND BY THE CONGRESS 36 (Comm. Print 1983) (“Privacy interests frequently conflict with other
important governmental interests such as economy and efficiency. As a result, there is a constant risk
that privacy concerns will not be fully or fairly considered by federal agencies.”); OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC SSES AND INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY 6 (1986) (citing The
President’s Annual Report on the Agencies’ Implementation of the Privacy Act of 1974, CY 1982-1983
118 (Dec. 4, 1985)) (noting a change in executive branch focus from privacy-related concerns to
interest in efficiency, management, and budget).
246
The Senate passed S. 3418 on November 21, 1974 on the same day, the House passed H.R.
16,373. The House took up S. 3418, but retained only the enacting clause. After substituting the House
language, the House passed S. 3418 on December 11, 1974. Because insufficient time remained in the
session to submit the competing versions to a conference committee, an informal process was adopted
to reconcile the bills. See 120 Cong. Rec. 40,405-09, 40,881-83 (1974), reprinted in STAFF OF S.
COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS & STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 94th CONG.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY at 858–68, 987–94
(1976), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LH_privacy_act-1974.pdf [hereinafter
SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY] 94 (the legislative history consists of a brief analysis of the compromise
amendments entitled “Analysis of House and Senate Compromise Amendments to the Federal Privacy
Act”).
247
See Todd Roberts Coles, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right to Privacy? An
Examination of the Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 957, 969–75 (1990) (discussing the
legislative compromises that led to adoption of a more conservative version of the bill).
248
See JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 20:3 (2013) (noting flaws in
the Privacy Act as a piece of compromise legislation, questioning the existence of congressional intent
due to the hurried nature in which the bill was passed, and suggesting that statements from
Congressman Moorhead show that “expedient action on privacy legislation was to be achieved at all
costs . . . and expedient action necessarily has some costs in rationality of the lawmaking process”); id.
at § 20:2 (footnote omitted) (“Privacy Act legislative history is to be read cautiously; suggestions in a
report of one house, prior to the compromise that produced the final wording, are not determinative.”);
Oversight Committee of the Privacy Act of 1974: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Gov’t Operations, 98th Cong. 231 (1983) (statement of Ronald Plesser, former counsel to the Privacy
Protection Study Commission), available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000020244873
;view=1up;seq=1 (stating that the Privacy Act is “its own worst enemy”). As one commentator
remarked:

The consequence of this hasty and haphazard legislative process is an internally
inconsistent statute with no reliable indication of congressional intent. The original
committee reports are of limited value in interpreting the final statute. The only
reliable legislative history consists of a rather skimpy staff analysis . . . .
Consequently, courts are likely to have great difficulty interpreting the Act and
vigorous enforcement may be impossible.
ROBERT E. BOUCHARD & JUSTIN D. FRANKLIN, GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
45 (1980).
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part of the compromise, the Senate conceded on oversight, remedies, and
the creation of a broad exemption provision.249 The Senate version of the
bill originally included a Privacy Commission that was authorized to
investigate and enforce provisions of the Act.250 In its effort to reach a
compromise and pass the bill, the Senate agreed to replace the powers
afforded the Privacy Commission with a Privacy Protection Study
Commission, which was “stripped of investigatory and enforcement
powers, [and] was [instead] directed to study and [examine the federal
agency protection] of personal information.”251 The original Senate bill
included the opportunity for broad damages, injunctive relief, and a
provision for the recovery of punitive damages.252 Instead, the compromise
limited recovery of damages to “willful or intentional” agency action,
“eliminated punitive damages, limited injunctive relief, and restricted
recovery of reasonable costs and attorney fees.”253 Finally, while absent in
the original Senate bill, the compromise adopted a “routine use” exemption
to the nondisclosure provision of the statute.254
The potential import of these compromises and the overall limitations
of the Federal Privacy Act are illustrated when applied to those seeking to
defy S-Comm’s reach. While state and local governments may have
concerns that the information they provided to the FBI was not intended
for use by the DHS, state and local governments are unlikely to have
derivative standing to litigate statutory claims under the Federal Privacy
Act.255 Furthermore, the Act’s protections are only afforded to certain
249
See O’REILLY, supra note 248, at § 20:3 (footnotes omitted) (“Principal changes made in the
Senate version [for the compromise bill], in favor of a more conservative House text, were the ‘use’
provision, the study of additional issues by an advisory body, and the elimination of application of
privacy requirements for criminal data banks and private and nonfederal government data banks.”).
250
Coles, supra note 247, at 973.
251
Id. at 973–74 (footnote omitted). Coles argues:

The compromise clearly favored the House bill and revealed a preference for the
government’s right to gather and to use personal information over the individual’s
right to privacy. By adopting a higher standard of proof for actual damages while
limiting the availability of other damages, the compromise restricted access to civil
remedies and diminished the role of private enforcement. Furthermore, under the
compromise, the advisory authority of the Study Commission was substituted for the
investigatory and enforcement powers of the Privacy Commission. Finally, adoption
of the routine use language freed federal agencies from strict adherence to the
nondisclosure provision and introduced a means to circumvent the Privacy Act.
Only the active support and oversight of Congress and the executive branch could
redress the imbalance.
Id. at 975 (footnotes omitted).
252
Id. at 972–73.
253
Id. at 974 (internal quotation marks omitted).
254
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
255
Privacy Act rights are personal to the individual who is the subject of the record, and others
cannot assert rights derivatively. See, e.g., Parks v. IRS, 618 F.2d 677, 684–85 (10th Cir. 1980)
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individuals. The statute defines a protected individual as “a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence . . . .”256 While there are four separate and distinct civil causes of
action under the Federal Privacy Act, two of which provide for injunctive
relief and two of which provide for damages,257 individuals seeking relief
(holding that a union lacked standing to sue for damages suffered by its members); Dresser Indus. Inc.
v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a company lacks standing to litigate
employees’ Privacy Act claims); Word v. United States, 604 F.2d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding
that a criminal defendant lacked standing to allege Privacy Act violations regarding use at trial of
medical records concerning third party); Raley v. Astrue, No. 2:11cv555-WC, 2012 WL 2368609, at *8
(M.D. Ala. June 21, 2012) (“Plaintiff brings a claim on behalf of the individuals whose information she
received and Plaintiff lacks standing to do so.”); Lorenzo v. United States, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1208,
1215–16 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a claim for recovery for
adverse effects she suffered based on the disclosure of her husband’s record because only individuals
identified in a record can request the record and subsequently state a claim for a violation of the
Privacy Act); Research Air, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that an
individual’s attorney has no Privacy Act rights to request documents relating to his client absent the
client’s consent); Sirmans v. Caldera, 27 F. Supp. 2d 248, 250 (D.D.C. 1998) (“[Plaintiffs] may not
object to the Army’s failure to correct the records of other officers.”); Shulman v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs., No. 94 CIV.5506, 1997 WL 68554, at *1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1997)
(holding that the plaintiff had no standing to assert any right that might have belonged to former
spouse), aff’d, 122 F.3d 1057 (1997) (unpublished opinion); Harbolt v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. A84-CA-280, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 1985) (establishing that the prisoner lacked standing to
assert Privacy Act claims of other inmates regarding disclosure of their records to him); Abramsky v.
U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 478 F. Supp. 1040, 1041–42 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that a
union president cannot compel release of records pertaining to an employee’s termination); Attorney
Gen. of the United States v. Irish N. Aid Comm., No. 77-700, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13581, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1977) (holding that the committee lacked standing to sue in representative capacity).
But see Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees v. Greenberg, 789 F. Supp. 430, 433 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding
that the union has associational standing because members whose interests the union seeks to represent
would themselves have standing), vacated on other grounds, 983 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
256
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2) (2012). Compare this definition with the Freedom
of Information Act’s much broader “any person” definition. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (2012); see also
Fares v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., No. 94-1339, 1995 WL 115809, at *4 (4th Cir. Mar.
20, 1995) (per curiam) (“[T]he [Privacy] Act only protects citizens of the United States or aliens
lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”); Raven v. Panama Canal Co., 583 F.2d 169, 170–71 (5th
Cir. 1978) (comparing use of the word “individual” in the Privacy Act with the word “person,” as more
broadly used in the FOIA); Rojas-Vega v. Cejka, No. 09CV2489, 2010 WL 1541369, at *3 (S.D. Cal.
Apr. 15, 2010) (dismissing an access claim brought by a plaintiff whose “lawful U.S. resident alien
status was revoked” because the plaintiff “cannot state a claim for a benefit that he is clearly not
entitled to under the Privacy Act” and because “Congress purposely limited the Privacy Act in this
manner, in contrast to FOIA”); Cudzich v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 886 F. Supp. 101,
105 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that a plaintiff whose permanent resident status had been revoked “is not
an ‘individual’ for the purposes of the Privacy Act,” but might nevertheless be entitled to information
under the FOIA).
257
The statute provides for four separate and distinct civil causes of action. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)
(2012). Two of these provide for injunctive relief: amendment lawsuits under section 552a(g)(1)(A) (if
the agency makes a determination not to amend an individual’s record after request) and access
lawsuits under section 552a(g)(1)(B) (when the agency refuses to comply with an individual request to
get access to his records). Id. §§ 552a(g)(1)(A), (B). Two provide for compensatory relief in the form
of monetary damages: damages lawsuits under section 552a(g)(1)(C) (for failure to maintain any record
of an individual resulting in an adverse action against the individual) and damages lawsuits under
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from S-Comm’s overbroad sharing provisions will likely base their claim
on a violation of the disclosure prohibition.
The disclosure prohibition bars an agency from disclosing any record
“contained in a system of records” to another person or agency unless the
individual provides written consent.258 In order to succeed on a claim under
the disclosure prohibition, an individual must prove that: the disclosed
information is a “record” contained in a “system of records”; 259 that the
agency disclosed the information; 260 that the disclosure had an adverse
effect on the individual;261 and that the disclosure was willful or
intentional.262 Moreover, even if the individual is able to prove each of
these elements, there is a set of express exemptions, one of which involves
disclosures made pursuant to a “routine use” as defined in the statute.263 In
the context of a U.S. citizen or LPR claiming that the disclosure of
fingerprints from the FBI to the DHS violated his/her rights under the
Federal Privacy Act, some of these elements will be at issue.
The first two elements will not likely be at issue. The statute clearly
states that a “record” includes fingerprints and a “system of records” is
section 552a(g)(1)(D) (for failure to comply with any other provision of the act in a way that has an
adverse effect on the individual). Id. §§ 552a(g)(1)(C), (D).
258
Id. § 552a(b) (“No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records
by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written
request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains . . . .”).
259
Id. §§ 552a(a)(4)–(5).
260
Id. § 552a(b).
261
See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 624 (2004) (“‘[A]dverse effect’ acts as a term of art
identifying a potential plaintiff who satisfies the injury-in-fact and causation requirements of Article III
standing, and who may consequently bring a civil action without suffering dismissal for want of
standing to sue.”); Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 505–06 (6th Cir. 2011)
(“[Plaintiff’s] request to pursue a claim under § 552a(e)(4) was properly denied because she failed to
allege or show the requisite ‘adverse effect’ from Defendants’ alleged failure to provide notice
specifically regarding the [system of records] at an earlier date.”); McCready v. Nicholson, 465 F.3d 1,
20 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (remanding the case to the district court to determine whether the plaintiff suffered
an “adverse effect” by being denied a bonus).
262
5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2012). The statute provides that:
In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of this
section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was
intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount
equal to the sum of . . . actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the
refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than
the sum of $1,000.
Id. § 552a(g)(4)(A).
263
See id. § 552a(a)(7) (defining “‘routine use’ . . . with respect to the disclosure of a record” as
“the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was
collected”); id. § 552a(b)(3) (prohibiting an agency from disclosing any record in a system of records
without the written consent of the individual the record pertains to unless the disclosure of the record
would be “for a routine use”); id. § 552a(e)(4)(D) (requiring agencies that maintain systems of records
to publish a notice in the Federal Register, which describes the system and includes “each routine use
of the records contained in the system, including the categories of users and the purpose of such use”).
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defined as “a group of any records under the control of any agency from
which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some
identifying . . . particular assigned to the individual.”264 Additionally, there
is not an issue about whether a disclosure was made as the statute
expressly prohibits the disclosure of a record from a system of records
from one agency to another.265 However, the questions of whether the
individual can show an “adverse effect,” whether the disclosure was
intentional and/or willful, and whether the government has a defense under
the “routine use” exception will be controversial.
The “adverse effect” element serves as a jurisdictional standing
requirement.266 An “adverse effect” is not limited to monetary damages,
264
Id. §§ 552a(a)(4)–(5) (defining “record” as “any item . . . including, but not limited to . . . a
finger or voice print” and defining a “system of record” as “a group of any records under the control of
any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying
number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual”).
265
Id. § 552a(b).
266
See, e.g., Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 624 (2004) (“‘[A]dverse effect’ acts as a term of art
identifying a potential plaintiff who satisfies the injury-in-fact and causation requirements of Article III
standing, and who may consequently bring a civil action without suffering dismissal for want of
standing to sue.”); Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 505–06 (6th Cir. 2011)
(“[Plaintiff’s] request to pursue a claim under § 552a(e)(4) was properly denied because she failed to
allege or show the requisite ‘adverse effect’ from Defendants’ alleged failure to provide notice
specifically regarding the [system of records] at an earlier date.”); McCready v. Nicholson, 465 F.3d 1,
20 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (remanding the case for the district court to determine whether the plaintiff suffered
an “adverse effect” by being denied a bonus); Quinn v. Stone, 978 F.2d 126, 135 (3d Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted) (“[T]he adverse effect requirement of (g)(1)(D) is, in effect, a standing
requirement.”); Mata v. McHugh, No. SA-10-CV-838-XR, 2012 WL 2376285, at *6 (W.D. Tex. June
22, 2012) (granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to allege
facts that establish that the disclosure of a record had an adverse effect on him); Mauldin v. Napolitano,
No. 10-12826, 2011 WL 3113104, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 26, 2011) (holding that “[e]ven if the Court
exercised subject matter jurisdiction, this case would be dismissed because [the plaintiff] has failed to
properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted” by failing to establish that an agency disclosed
information and that such disclosure had an adverse effect on him); Conley v. United States, No. 2:10cv-444, 2011 WL 1256611, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2011) (dismissing the case on the additional
ground that the plaintiff failed to “allege a valid adverse determination or adverse effect”); Shope v.
Dep’t of Navy, No. 1:CV-09-2400, 2010 WL 2766638, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 13, 2010) (“First, as
mentioned previously, the effect requirement is a standing requirement.”); Sieverding v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 693 F. Supp. 2d 93, 106 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing claims brought because the plaintiff did not
allege any adverse effects caused by the defendants’ “supposed violations of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c), and
[the plaintiff] cannot sue for any such violations”), aff’d, No. 10-5149, 2010 WL 4340348 (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 19, 2010); Ciralsky v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 689 F. Supp. 2d 141, 155–56 (D.D.C. 2010)
(noting that the definition of “actual damages” under the Privacy Act remains unclear, but that it “is
undisputed that if a plaintiff can show neither pecuniary or emotional damages, then there is no injury
upon which a court can grant monetary relief under the Privacy Act”); Sutera v. Transp. Sec. Admin.,
708 F. Supp. 2d 304, 318–19 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff’s Privacy Act claim because it
was not ripe because the plaintiff only alleged a speculative fear that its reputation would be damaged
which does not satisfy the injury-in-fact and causation requirements for standing); Goodwin v. Johnson,
No. 8:10CV40, 2010 WL 1500872, at *3 (D. Neb. Apr. 14, 2010) (holding that the plaintiff failed to
show that the defendant failed to “elicit information from her to the greatest extent practicable” or that
the defendant’s “violation adversely impacted her” but allowing the plaintiff to amend her complaint);
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but also includes nonpecuniary, nonphysical harm, such as mental distress,
embarrassment, or emotional trauma.267 The initial standing requirement to
Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 660 F. Supp. 2d 31, 49–50 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that the “plaintiff’s
claim to relief under the Privacy Act must be rejected” because the plaintiff failed to show that he
suffered actual damages or that the disclosure had an adverse effect on him); Hass v. U.S. Air Force,
848 F. Supp. 926, 932 (D. Kan. 1994) (granting summary judgment because the plaintiff’s “claim fails
on the causation element, which requires the plaintiff to show that the disclosure caused an adverse
decision to be made”); Swenson v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. S-87-1282 MLS, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16524, at *29 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1994) (“To maintain a suit for damages under the [Privacy] Act’s
catch-all provision, plaintiff must next establish that the violation had an ‘adverse effect’ on her . . . .
The adverse effect element has two components: standing and causation.”); Green v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
No. 88 Civ. 0539 (CES), 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6846, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1989) (holding that the
plaintiff “failed to state a claim either for amendment or damages under the Privacy Act” by failing to
allege adverse determination as a result of a failure to maintain records); Harper v. United States, 423
F. Supp. 192, 196–97 (D. S.C. 1976) (establishing that “[i]n order to obtain jurisdiction for an
injunction or for damages under the Privacy Act, a plaintiff must in effect allege that the disclosures of
which he complains have caused him ‘an adverse effect’” and holding that the plaintiff failed to plead
any circumstances that would show causation or adverse effect, and “[t]herefore, plaintiff has failed to
plead adequately either the ‘adverse effect’ required by the Privacy Act . . . or the ‘fair notice of actual
wrong’ required by Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); see also Raley v. Astrue, No.
2:11cv555-WC, 2012 WL 2368609, at *7 (M.D. Ala. June 21, 2012) (“Plaintiff presents no evidence to
establish that receiving someone else’s information did in fact adversely affect her.”).
267
See, e.g., Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1382–83 (11th Cir. 2010) (indicating that the plaintiff “alleged numerous
injuries sufficient to satisfy . . . the ‘adverse’ effect element of the Privacy Act” including “damage to
his personal and professional reputation” and “grave mental anguish and emotional distress”); Doe v.
Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 185, 187 (4th Cir. 2002) (Michael, J., dissenting) (indicating that Judge Michael,
would “also agree that emotional distress can qualify as an adverse effect.”), aff’d, 540 U.S. 614
(2004); Quinn, 978 F.2d at 135–36 (indicating that “stress and emotional anguish” and “suffer[ing]” as
a result of “occupational losses” are “sufficient to satisfy the Privacy Act’s adverse effect standing
requirement”); Englerius v. Veterans Admin., 837 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1988) (indicating that “[a]t
least two circuits have construed ‘adverse effect’ to include emotional trauma”); Albright v. United
States, 732 F.2d 181, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that the court “agree[d] with the appellants’
argument that emotional trauma alone is sufficient to qualify as an ‘adverse effect’”); Usher v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 721 F.2d 854, 856 (1st Cir. 1983) (asserting that “since the only damages
alleged are those owing to a wrongful reduction of benefits, there remains no possibility of plaintiff’s
suffering any ‘adverse effect’”); Parks v. U.S. Internal Revenue Serv., 618 F.2d 677, 682–83 n.2 (10th
Cir. 1980) (indicating “an adverse effect upon the aggrieved individual” was shown in the form of
psychological harm); Iqbal v. FBI, No. 3:11-cv-369-J-37JBT, 2012 WL 2366634, at *6 n.10 (M.D. Fla.
June 21, 2012) (stating that “emotional trauma is sufficient” for “the ‘adverse affect’ requirement”);
Kvech v. Holder, No. 10-cv-545 (RLW), 2011 WL 4369452, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2011) (quoting
Albright, 732 F.2d at 186) (stating that “emotional trauma alone is sufficient to qualify as an ‘adverse
effect’”); Rice v. United States, 245 F.R.D. 3, 6 (D.D.C. 2007) (indicating that “[p]laintiffs have
satisfied this burden . . . by submitting declarations with their reply brief . . . claim[ing] to have suffered
‘anger, dismay, anxiety, and fear about what has occurred and what could happen’” and that the
declarations “are sufficient to establish plaintiffs’ standing under the Privacy Act”); Lechliter v. Dep’t
of Army, No. 04-814-KAJ, 2006 WL 462750, at *5 (D. Del. Feb. 27, 2006) (stating that “[a]llegations
of mental distress or increased emotional trauma have been held to be sufficient adverse effects”);
Schmidt v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 218 F.R.D. 619, 632 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (indicating that “it is
well-established that emotional trauma, which can take the form of stress, embarrassment, and
emotional anguish, constitutes an adverse effect”) (citations omitted); Romero-Vargas v. Shalala, 907
F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (suggesting that “[t]he better reasoned view, taken by the
overwhelming majority of courts, is that emotional distress caused by the fact that the plaintiff’s
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plead “adverse effect” is distinct from the requirement of “actual
damages.”268 A showing of causation is also required; specifically, the
injured party needs to show that the violation of the Privacy Act caused an
adverse effect and that the violation caused actual damages.269 Case law
privacy has been violated is itself an adverse effect,” instead of a “restrictive approach” where “a
plaintiff must show actual pecuniary loss in order to have standing to bring a claim under the Privacy
Act”); cf. Tarullo v. Def. Contract Audit Agency, 600 F. Supp. 2d 352, 354, 359 (D. Conn. 2009)
(granting summary judgment where “the disclosures of the [p]laintiff’s [social security number] had
[no] adverse effect on [him] other than the displeasure he felt because these disclosures were against
his wishes”); Clark v. Bureau of Prisons, 407 F. Supp. 2d 127, 131 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Nothing in the
record . . . connects the alleged adverse effect, i.e., plaintiff’s maltreatment, with the disclosure at
issue.”); Doyon v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 304 F. Supp. 2d 32, 35 (D.D.C. 2004) (“assum[ing] without
deciding that the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ decision ‘to restrict [plaintiff] from a transfer and many
Institutional programs’ . . . is an adverse determination,” but finding the claim to have been rendered
moot) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). But see Risch v. Henderson, 128 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441
(E.D. Mich. 1999) (conflating the concepts of “adverse effect” and “actual damages,” and stating that
even assuming that there had been a violation of the Privacy Act for the maintenance of alleged “secret
files,” because plaintiff claimed only “extreme mental anguish and mental concern and worry,” she had
“failed to demonstrate” an “adverse effect”), aff’d, Risch v. U.S. Postal Serv., 244 F.3d 510 (6th Cir.
2001).
268
See, e.g., Fort Hall Landowners Alliance, Inc. v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 2d
1220, 1225 (D. Idaho 2006) (“It is important not to confuse this standing requirement with the entirely
separate element that requires proof of actual damages . . . . Thus, to satisfy the Privacy Act’s adverse
effect and causation requirements, plaintiffs need not show actual damages from the disclosure, but
must merely satisfy the traditional ‘injury-in-fact and causation requirements of Article III.’”). As one
district court has explained, “[t]he requirement of an ‘adverse effect’ requires more” than a “statement
of ‘damages’ [that] merely summarizes the alleged violations of law.” Foncello v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Army, No. 3:04-CV-604 (JCH), 2005 WL 2994011, at *4 (D. Conn. Nov. 7, 2005). The distinct nature
of these two elements is demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s review in Fed. Aviation Admin. v.
Cooper, No. 10-1024, slip op. at 4–9 (March 28, 2012), of an opinion by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Cooper v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 622 F.3d 1016, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that for
actual damages, “Congress clearly intended that when a federal agency intentionally or willfully fails to
uphold its record-keeping obligations under the Act, and that failure proximately causes an adverse
effect on the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary injuries”).
In Cooper, the Ninth Circuit, in construing the Privacy Act to allow for the recovery of nonpecuniary
damages, reasoned that because mental distress or emotional harm is sufficient to constitute an adverse
effect, a construction of the Act that allowed a plaintiff to establish standing for an injury that results in
nonpecuniary harm, but that would not allow the plaintiff to seek actual damages for such a
nonpecuniary injury, would “frustrate the intent of Congress.” Cooper, 622 F.3d at 1021. The Ninth
Circuit majority went on to state that “[i]n contrast, our opinion is true to the overall objective of the
Act, allowing a plaintiff who demonstrates a nonpecuniary adverse effect to have the opportunity to
recover nonpecuniary damages.” Id. However, on writ of certiorari a majority of the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion and held that the Privacy Act does not authorize damages for
nonpecuniary injuries such as mental or emotional distress. Fed. Aviation Admin., No. 10-1024, slip op.
at 19. The Supreme Court did not so much as consider the separate issue of “adverse effect” in its
ruling. See id. at 12 (asserting that “any doubt about the plausibility of construing ‘actual damages’ in
the Privacy Act synonymously with ‘special damages’ is put to rest by Congress’ refusal to authorize
‘general damages’” and stating that “we held that it was ‘beyond serious doubt’ that general damages
are not available for violations of the Privacy Act”).
269
See, e.g., Beaven v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 622 F.3d 540, 558 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding that
“the Plaintiffs [were] unable to prove causation” and that “by extension . . . also cannot prove that the
disclosure would cause any future ‘out-of-pocket losses.’”); Sweeney v. Chertoff, 178 F. App’x 354,
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also makes it clear that the injury must be distinct from the violation of the
act itself.270
In the context of S-Comm’s overbroad fingerprint sharing protocol, it
is inevitable that the fingerprints of some U.S. citizens and lawful
permanent residents will be shared with the DHS. Because of inaccurate
records and misinformation or administrative error, some of these U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents have been unlawfully detained on
immigration holds despite the fact that they are either citizens or lawfully
permitted to remain in the United States.271 If the sharing of information
from the FBI to the DHS results in an individual’s unlawful incarceration,
the showing of an adverse effect does not seem difficult to prove. The
FBI’s sharing of the information caused the DHS to improperly issue an
immigration detainer and hold a U.S. citizen or LPR unlawfully.
In order to succeed in a claim for damages, the agency must have acted
in an “intentional or willful” manner.272 The terms “intentional” and

357–58 (5th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the plaintiff’s “injury is sufficiently attenuated from any
violation of the Act’s requirements to preclude a finding of causation” and “failed to show that any
violation caused the injury of which he complains.”); Mandel v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 79 F.
App’x 479, 481–82 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding that the “causation between . . . disclosures and the
adverse effects alleged is too attenuated to prove a violation of the Privacy Act” where the witnesses
who reviewed the plaintiff’s records were the plaintiff’s previous supervisors who were “already wellacquainted with the circumstances of [the plaintiff’s] prior employment” and further asserting that “[i]n
order to establish the requisite causal connection, a plaintiff must demonstrate a close nexus between
the disclosure and the adverse effects alleged.”); Orekoya v. Mooney, 330 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2003)
(asserting that “the plaintiff would have to show a causal connection between the Privacy Act violation
and the emotional distress damages,” agreeing with the district court in determining that plaintiff’s
“claim of emotional distress ‘lacks credibility,’” and further asserting that “[e]ven if [the plaintiff]
could have proven emotional distress, there was nothing but speculation to link it to a Privacy Act
violation.”); Quinn, 978 F.2d at 135 (stating that “to state a claim under the Act, the plaintiff must . . .
allege a causal connection between the agency violation and the adverse effect.”); Hewitt v. Grabicki,
794 F.2d 1373, 1379–80 (9th Cir. 1986) (asserting that “[t]he Privacy Act requires a causal connection
between the allegedly erroneous agency record and an adverse determination made against the
individual” and concluding that the plaintiff’s “resignation from the Veterans Administration involved
a dispute concerning his health and ability to return to work, and was not causally related to the
contents of the proficiency report.”).
270
Schmidt v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 218 F.R.D. 619, 632 (E.D. Wis 2003); see also Doe
v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 185, 186 (4th Cir. 2002) (Michaels, J., dissenting) (“The causal prong makes it
especially clear that an adverse effect must be something distinct from the intentional and willful
violation itself. For if a violation of the Privacy Act was sufficient to constitute an adverse effect, there
could be no question of whether the violation caused the adverse effect, and hence the causal prong
would be superfluous.”).
271
For a detailed analysis of the dangers associated with the S-Comm automation system,
including false negatives and positives, see Kalhan, supra note 191, at 1135–41.
272
5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2012) (“In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C)
or (D) of this section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was
intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum
of . . . actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case
shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000 . . . .”).
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“willful” under the Federal Privacy Act are terms of art. As revealed by
the Act’s legislative history, the “intentional” or “willful” standard is “[o]n
a continuum between negligence and the very high standard of willful,
arbitrary, or capricious conduct,” and “is viewed as only somewhat greater
than gross negligence.”274 Either the agency committed the act without
grounds for believing it to be lawful or by flagrant disregard for the rights
of others. While the standard does not require premeditated malice,275 it is
a difficult,276 but not impossible,277 standard to meet.
273

White v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 840 F.2d 85, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
120 CONG. REC. 40, 406 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 246 at
858, 862.
275
Parks v. IRS, 618 F.2d 677, 683 (10th Cir. 1980).
276
See, e.g., Luster v. Vilsack, 667 F.3d 1089, 1098 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[G]iven the lack of any
authority in support of [plaintiff’s] contention that it is a violation of the Privacy Act to transmit
confidential materials (all but one of which was covered by a transmittal cover sheet) to an unsecured
fax machine, we agree with the district court that [plaintiff] has not demonstrated that any actual
disclosure by [defendant] was willful and intentional.”); Campbell v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 446 F. App’x
477, 479, 481 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (upholding the district court’s conclusion that “there was no
record evidence to support an assertion of willful or intentional conduct” where the district court found
that the plaintiff’s “assertion that his wife discovered some documents in her SSA file that should have
been in his file, if true, established nothing more than negligence”); Maydak v. United States, 630 F.3d
166, 179–82 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that, “assum[ing], without deciding, that BOP’s review and
retention of the duplicate photos [of prisoners] constituted a ‘system of records,’” BOP did not
intentionally or willfully commit Privacy Act violations because, among other reasons, “the
photographs . . . were used only for legitimate law enforcement purposes” and, “[n]otwithstanding the
court’s critical discussion of the review and retention policies” in prior opinions, “BOP officials were
still never placed on clear notice that their practices violated the Act”); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d
1256, 1268 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that the standard was not met where a VA physician accessed the
plaintiff’s medical records because the physician testified that “he thought he could access the record so
long as he had a ‘need to know’” and, “given that [plaintiff’s] health records were relevant to whether
he could continue working at the VA, [that] belief was reasonable”); Powers v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,
296 F. App’x 86, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that, where the plaintiff “claim[ed] only that the
Commission acted ‘intentionally’” in “‘not maintain[ing] correct records’” and that “its ‘negligence’
violated his Privacy Act rights,” his complaint “imputes at most ‘gross negligence’ to the Commission
with regard to its maintenance and use of inaccurate records”); Puerta v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human
Servs., No. 99-55497, 2000 WL 863974, at *3 (9th Cir. June 28, 2000) (holding that, where the agency,
upon the advice of its general counsel’s office, disclosed documents in response to a grand jury
subpoena, the agency “may have intentionally produced [the] documents, but it does not necessarily
follow that [it] intentionally violated . . . the Privacy Act”); Scrimgeour v. IRS, 149 F.3d 318, 325–26
(4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff did not “demonstrate the higher standard of culpability
required for recovery under the Privacy Act” where the court had already determined that the IRS’s
release of his tax returns did not meet the lower standard of gross negligence for recovery under the
provision of the Internal Revenue Code).
277
Several District Court decisions have found “intentional or willful” violations of the statue.
See, e.g., Carlson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., No. 04 C 7937, 2006 WL 3409150, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21,
2006) (finding no willful violation when an agency employee’s supervisor sent an email to other
agency personnel and to individuals outside the agency regarding the plaintiff’s termination settlement
agreement, which included “unnecessary details concerning [employee’s] personal information” and
which supervisor encouraged recipients to disseminate); Johnson v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 03-2047,
slip op. 11–12 (D. Colo. June 17, 2005) (finding no willful violation of BOP regulations and policy,
when BOP health systems specialist made statements regarding medical privacy); Doe v. Herman, No.
274
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Individuals harmed by improper information sharing could argue that
the continuous pattern of overbroad sharing and the knowledge of
imperfect records make the indiscriminate sharing intentional or willful.
CIV.A.297CV00043, 1999 WL 1000212, at *13–14 (W.D. Va. Oct. 29, 1999) (magistrate’s
recommendation) (finding a willful violation based on unnecessary disclosure of a claimant’s social
security number on a multi-captioned hearing form to twenty other claimants, coal companies, and
insurance companies), adopted in part & rev’d in part, No. Civ.A. 2:97CV00043, 2000 WL 34204432
(W.D. Va. July 24, 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, & remanded, Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170 (4th
Cir. 2002), aff’d, 540 U.S. 614 (2004); Stewart v. FBI, No. 97-1595, slip op. at 5–8 (D. Or. Mar. 12,
1999) (finding no willful violation of subsections (b) and (e)(6) based on the dissemination of an
incorrect report containing criminal allegations concerning plaintiff), withdrawn by stipulation as part
of settlement, No. 97-1595-HA, 2000 WL 739253 (D. Or. May 12, 2000); Tomasello v. Rubin, No. 931326, slip op. at 17–19 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 1997) (finding no willful violation based on disclosure to “60
Minutes” and all 4,500 ATF employees of details concerning plaintiff’s EEO complaint), aff’d on other
grounds, 167 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Porter, No. CV595-30, slip op. at 22–23 (S.D. Ga. July 24,
1997) (finding no willful violation / willful violation based on disclosure by Postmaster to USPS
personnel who had no “need to know” of plaintiff’s two-week suspension for impersonating a postal
inspector); Romero-Vargas v. Shalala, 907 F. Supp. 1128, 1133–34 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (finding a willful
violation based on telephonic verification or non-verification of plaintiffs’ social security number
provided by the agency to their employers in violation of regulations and agency employee manual).
However, only two courts of appealsthe court of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuitshave
found “intentional or willful” violations of the statue. See Beaven v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 622 F.3d
540, 552–53 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding the district court in determining that the agent “willfully
violated the Privacy Act by flagrantly disregarding the . . . employees’ rights under the Act” in “leaving
the unmarked folder in an inmate-accessible area”); Louis v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 19 F. App’x 487, 489
(9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the Department of Labor’s “disregard of both the district court’s prior
decision . . . and its own assurance that it would annotate the memo in its files ‘to reflect that it is not to
be considered in any future action related to [the plaintiff’s] claim’ constitutes a willful failure on the
part of the government to abide by its obligations” and holding that the plaintiff “is entitled to . . .
damages” as a result of the court’s “strong[] dissapprov[al] of the DOL’s attempts to circumvent the
Privacy Act.”); Wilborn v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 49 F.3d 597, 602–03 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that “the agency acted in a manner that was intentional and willful . . . under the Privacy Act”
as a result of the agency including “inappropriate” language in a published decision despite the attorney
advisor’s assessment that “the language at issue was inappropriate and should not be included in the
decision”); Covert v. Harrington, 876 F.2d 751, 755–57 (9th Cir. 1989) (determining that there was “no
legitimate basis for the government’s failure to comply with § [552a](e)(3)(C),” a provision concerning
“an Agency collecting information,” and “conclud[ing] that the violation was intentional or willful for
the purposes of the damage award”); cf. Oja v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1122, 1125, 1136
(9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that “it was clear . . . that the [agency’s] disclosures were intentional or
willful” where the agency posted information about a former employee on its website, but determined
that the provision’s “tolling provisions are entirely inapposite to [the] claims”). But see generally
Downie v. City of Middleburg Heights, 301 F.3d 688, 697–99 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating, in the course of
ruling that a remedial scheme of the Privacy Act barred Bivens action, that “[w]hile the Privacy Act
does not provide a separate damages remedy for the intentional or willful creation, maintenance, or
dissemination of false records in retaliation for an individual’s First Amendment rights, we believe that
retaliation on any basis clearly constitutes intentional or willful action”); Toolasprashad v. Bureau of
Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 581, 584, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reversing and remanding the case where the
district court had found that the record would not support a finding of intentional and willful action,
and stating that, “[i]f proven, retaliatory fabrication of prison records would certainly meet [our]
definition [as articulated in Deters] of a willful or intentional Privacy Act violation”).
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Additionally, if the individual can show that the records were incorrect, for
example, by identifying the person as a non-citizen, then he or she could
argue that the repeated failure to correct erroneous records constitutes
intentional and willful behavior.
Even if the harmed individual meets all of the elements, the
government has a series of exemptions that might provide a defense. In the
context of S-Comm implementation, the “routine use” exemption provides
the government just such a defense.278 The definition’s potential breadth
makes this provision of the Act controversial.279 The legislative history
adopting the “routine use” exemption illustrates some of the dangers
associated with the provision.280 The purpose of the “routine use”
exemption was to allow for orderly and efficient government functioning
by allowing federal agencies to routinely exchange information for
“housekeeping measures”281 but not to allow the government to
indiscriminately circumvent the nondisclosure provision of the Act. Aware
of this distinction, the legislative history makes explicit the distinction
between sharing information for “housekeeping” purposes and other
sharing of information that has the potential to result in unnecessary and

278
See Coles, supra note 247, at 975 (asserting that “adoption of the routine use language freed
federal agencies from strict adherence to the non-disclosure provision and introduced a means to
circumvent the Privacy Act”).
279
See PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 517–
18 (1977), available at http:/epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report.
280
Coles, supra note 247, at 977. Coles states:

Where the Senate bill would have placed tight restrictions upon the transfer of
personal information between or outside Federal agencies, the House bill, under the
routine use provision, would permit an agency to describe its routine uses in the
Federal Register and then disseminate the information without the consent of the
individual or without applying the standards of accuracy, relevancy, timeliness or
completeness so long as no determination was being made about the subject.
Id. at 977 n.131 (quoting LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 213, at 859).
281
Id. at 976 (citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 213, at 859); Privacy Act Implementation
Guidelines and Responsibilities for Office of Management and Budget, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,953
(July 9, 1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 213, 1030 (noting that the routine use
exemption was introduced in recognition of the corollary purposes to which collected information may
be “appropriate and necessary” for “efficient conduct of government” and “in the best interest of both
the individual and the public”). Representative Moorhead explained the rationale of the exemption:
It would be an impossible legislative task to attempt to set forth all of the
appropriate uses of Federal records about an identifiable individual. It is not the
purpose of the bill to restrict such ordinary uses of the information. Rather than
attempting to specify each proper use of such records, the bill gives each Federal
agency the authority to set forth the ‘routine’ purposes for which the records are to
be used under the guidance contained in the committee’s report.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 213, at 957.
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282

potentially damaging disclosures.
In an attempt to limit the breadth of the exception, the statute requires
the government to meet two separate requirements in order for the “routine
use” exemption to apply. First, it requires Federal Register publication of
“each routine use of the records contained in the system, including the
categories of users and the purpose of such use . . . .”283 Second, it requires
compatibility—“the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible
with the purpose for which it was collected . . . .”284
Despite these requirements, the S-Comm disclosure process from the
FBI to the DHS illustrates the breadth of the exception and the
opportunities for misuse.285 In terms of the publication requirement, the
Government can argue that pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D), the DOJ
has published in the Federal Register a notice of the existence of its
systems of records and the routine uses of the records. Specifically, the
282

Analysis of House and Senate Compromise Amendments to the Federal Privacy Act, 120
CONG. REC. 40,881 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 274, at 987–88.
This act is not intended to impose undue burdens on the transfer of information to
the Treasury Department to complete payroll checks, the receipt of information by
the Social Security Administration to complete quarterly posting of accounts, or
other such housekeeping measures and necessarily frequent interagency or intraagency transfers of information. It is, however, intended to discourage the
unnecessary exchange of information to other persons or to agencies who may not
be as sensitive to the collecting agency’s reasons for using and interpreting the
material.
Id.
283

5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D) (2012).
Id. § 552a(a)(7) (2012). In addition, the Ninth Circuit created a third requirement of actual
notice of the “routine use” at the time the information is collected from the individual. Covert v.
Harrington, 876 F.2d 751, 754–56 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Puerta v. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No.
99-55497, 2000 WL 863974, at *1–*2 (9th Cir. June 28, 2000) (indicating that “the agency invoking
the routine use exception must have informed the individual on the form used to collect information or
on a separate form that can be retained by the individual the routine uses that may be made of the
information”); cf. Stafford v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(explaining that notice need not “anticipate and list every single potential permutation of a routine use
in order to invoke this exception”). Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit cited this aspect of Covert with approval stating, “[a]lthough the statute itself does not provide,
in so many terms, that an agency’s failure to provide employees with actual notice of its routine uses
would prevent a disclosure from qualifying as a ‘routine use,’ that conclusion seems implicit in the
structure and purpose of the Act.” U.S. Postal Serv. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 9 F.3d 138, 146
(D.C. Cir. 1993). But cf. Thompson v. Dep’t of State, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2005)
(indicating that the statute “does not require the level of specificity in disclosure of the routine uses that
plaintiff desires” and that “[a]lthough the warning did not explicitly mention ‘routine uses,’ ‘[n]othing
in the Privacy Act requires agencies to employ the exact language of the statute to give effective
notice’”).
285
This potential for misuse was the very reason the “routine use” exemption was not in the
Senate version of the Privacy Act proposed bill. The authors of the Senate Bill rejected such a
provision because of the potential misuse by government. S. REP. NO. 98-1183, at 69 (1974), reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 213, at 222.
284
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DOJ has published several Blanket Routine Uses that apply “to every
existing FBI Privacy Act system of records.”286 Specifically, Blanket
Routine Use 6 provides that a record may be disclosed “[t]o such recipients
and under such circumstances and procedures as are mandated by Federal
statute or treaty.”287
In the context of S-Comm, section 1722(a)(2) of the Enhanced Border
Security Act mandates that:
the President shall develop and implement an interoperable
electronic data system to provide current and immediate
access to information in databases of Federal law
enforcement agencies and the intelligence community that is
relevant to determine whether to issue a visa or to determine
the admissibility or deportability of an alien.288
The statute specifically states that the federal government’s interoperable
database should be “readily and easily accessible” to federal immigration
officials “responsible for determining an alien’s admissibility . . . or
deportability.”289 The language does not clearly authorize the
indiscriminate transfer of all fingerprint records, regardless of the concern
about an individual’s admissibility or deportability.290 Furthermore, other
provisions of the Act specify that the use and dissemination of information
shared by federal law enforcement agencies with immigration officials
should be “used solely to determine whether to issue a visa to an alien or to
determine the admissibility or deportability of an alien to the United
States” and “to protect any privacy rights of individuals who are subjects
of such information.”291 While the government can argue that the
legislation requires the FBI and the DHS to share any information that is
relevant to immigration decisions as soon as such information is received
by either agency and that interoperable means bi-directional sharing of

286

66 Fed. Reg. 33,559 (June 22, 2001).
Id.
288
8 U.S.C. § 1722(a)(2) (2012).
289
Id. § 1722(a)(5) (2012).
290
Kalhan, supra note 191, at 1130–31. On this point, Kalhan writes:
287

[W]hile the Visa Reform Act seems to clearly authorize access to FBI records when
immigration or consular officials need to make particular decisions about visa
issuance, admissibility, or deportability, it is less clear that the provision authorizes
the routine bulk transmission to DHS of all state and local identification records in
its possession—on an ongoing basis as it receives them—of both U.S. citizens and
noncitizens in the absence of specific, pending immigration-related decisions for
which DHS needs that information.
Id.
291

8 U.S.C. § 1721(c)(3)(B) (2012).
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information, the original design of the S-Comm program was for the
DHS to request information from the FBI when necessary to make an
informed decision on admissibility or deportability.293 If the decision to
adopt a policy of indiscriminate transfer of all records was done for
convenience sake, then it seems the balance sought through passage of the
Federal Privacy Act has been upended. The government can also argue that
the statute requires access to all relevant information and that any
information in the federal database might impact an immigration decision
regarding “admissibility or deportability.”294 Despite these arguments, the
statutory authority relied upon is vague and general.295 And, the Attorney
General’s criminal recordkeeping authority is limited to “authorized”
federal officials, leaving open the question of whether the DHS is an
“authorized” federal official.296
In terms of the requirement of compatibility, there are additional
concerns with the indiscriminate sharing of fingerprints under S-Comm.
The fingerprints are taken by local law enforcement upon arrest and shared
292
Congress envisioned bi-directional sharing of information between FBI and DHS databases,
stating that it wanted to “achieve real time interoperability between the two-fingerprint Automated
Biometrics Identification System (IDENT), which is used by the Border patrol and US–VISIT, and the
FBI’s 10-fingerprint Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS).” H.R. REP. NO.
109-79, at 20 (2006); see H.R. REP. NO. 106-479, at 151 (1999) (directing AAG “to submit a plan by
November 1, 1999, to integrate the INS IDENT and the FBI IAFIS systems”).
293
See Memorandum of Understanding Among the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., the Dep’t of Justice,
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Info. Servs. Div. and the Dep’t of State Bureau of
Consular Affairs for Improved Info. Sharing Servs. (July 1, 2008) available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/dhsfbiinteroperabilitymoujuly2008.pdf.
(discussing policies and procedures for parties to contact each other).
294
8 U.S.C. § 1722(a)(2) (2012).
295
Kalhan, supra note 191, at 1162–63. Kalhan points out:

The main statutes upon which federal authorities have relied to implement these
programs provide only vague and general support for these initiatives, with one
having been enacted in 1930 to provide general authority for the FBI’s maintenance
of identification and criminal history records and the other having been adopted in
the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks to enable immigration officials to access
information in federal intelligence and law enforcement databases that may be
relevant when issuing visas or making admissibility or deportability determinations.
Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1722 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2012)).
296
Id. at 1130–31. The author explains:
[T]he authority cited by DHS is not unambiguous. The Attorney General’s general
criminal recordkeeping authority—whose ‘very general nature’ long had prompted
the FBI to act ‘cautiously’ in how it maintained and disseminated state and local
records in its possession—limits sharing of those records to ‘authorized’ federal
officials, leaving unanswered the extent of any authority to disseminate FBImaintained fingerprint records to DHS.
Id. (citing Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 722 (D.D.C. 1971); Menard, 328 F. Supp. at 722
(noting that “control of what arrest or criminal data remain in the [FBI’s] files rest in every
case . . . with the local arresting authority”).
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with the FBI for law enforcement purposes. The FBI then discloses the
fingerprints to the DHS for the purposes of immigration enforcement.
There are several arguments that compatibility must fail in this context.
First, the collection of fingerprint data for criminal justice purposes is
distinct from the collection of fingerprint data for civil immigration
purposes.297 Both the individuals whose fingerprints are taken and the local
governments that collect them are collecting them for criminal justice
purposes. The federal government then transforms that purpose by sharing
that data with the DHS for civil immigration purposes without the
permission of the individual whose fingerprints were taken. Informational
privacy theory identifies context and purpose as fundamental principles
that help analyze the extent to which information appropriately should be
shared.298 Context relates to the particular setting of personal information,
what type of information is considered sensitive may vary among
individuals and the willingness to share information may vary upon who
and when you are sharing it. Purpose relates to the specific intended use of
the information.299 A governance concern in this area is that information
collected for legitimate public purposes, in this context criminal
background checks, might be re-used or re-constituted in an
“unacceptable” fashion, indiscriminately shared with the DHS to check
against immigration databases.300
Second, there is an argument that the compatibility prong must fail
when the subject of the fingerprints is a U.S. citizen because the DHS has
no immigration enforcement authority against a U.S. citizen. As such, the
297
Kalhan, supra note 191, at 1144 (arguing that Secure Communities repurposes the biometric
records already maintained by the FBI by using them not only for criminal background purposes, but
also for immigration purposes and creates an expansive biometric data base that has many potential
future uses). See also Chad DeVeaux, A Tale of Two Searches: Intrusive Civil Discovery Rules Violate
the Fourth Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1086–92 (2014) (arguing that civil discovery rules can
violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches).
298
David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Statutory Frameworks for Regulating Information
Flows: Drawing Lessons for the DNA Data Banks from Other Government Data Systems, 34 J.L. MED
& ETHICS 366, 368 (2006).
299
Id. These authors explain that:

The principle of purpose has led to a number of enormously useful rules of thumb in
the field of informational privacy. It requires that the purpose of use of personal
information be made explicit and clear, for example through a precise statutory
mandate. Similarly, the purpose cannot be changed retroactively without disobeying
the principle of purpose, except if those affected agree, and personal information
that is no longer necessary for the intended purpose must be deleted. It also leads to
the conclusion that statutes ought only to require collecting, storing, and sharing that
personal information which is necessary to fulfill the purpose. Collecting
information just in case it may become useful at some future date or for some future
purpose would be contrary to the purpose principle.
Id.
300

Id.
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government would lack any statutory or regulatory authority to disclose
such information for the purposes of determining admissibility or
deportability. The government might argue that the disclosure of “a record
that indicates a violation or potential violation of law to the appropriate
agency charged with the responsibility of investigating or prosecuting such
violation or charged with enforcing such law” is a compatible disclosure.301
However, such an argument would lead to a very broad interpretation of
this exception. In effect, the FBI would be permitted to disclose the
information for investigative purposes only because they have no way of
knowing when they transmit the fingerprints who is a U.S. citizen, a lawful
permanent resident, an alien with a pending application for adjustment of
status, or an undocumented immigrant. If the government’s position were
accepted, then the FBI would be required to send DHS every fingerprint
that they obtain in the event that some of the people might be aliens.
However, 8 U.S.C. §1722 does not permit Blanket Routine Use 6 to be
used as a means of investigation; rather, it merely provides for the
transmission of information to determine whether to issue a visa or to
determine admissibility or deportability.302
In sum, U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents that are
improperly caught up in S-Comm’s reach have a potential remedy under
the Federal Privacy Act. However, in order to be successful, individuals
harmed would have to argue that the overbroad and indiscriminate sharing
of fingerprints, in light of the FBI’s knowledge that some of the
fingerprints will be of U.S. citizens and LPRs, constitutes intentional and
willful disclosure by the federal government. Additionally, they will have
to argue that S-Comm’s disclosure is not a valid “routine use” because the
information was collected for one purpose, criminal investigation, and then
disclosed for an entirely different purpose, immigration enforcement. In
discerning the appropriate reach of the “routine use” exemption,
examination of the legislative history and policy behind the exemption
support a limited interpretation of the exemption’s reach in the context of
S-Comm. The exemption was designed to allow for efficient and effective
sharing of information among federal agencies for “housekeeping”
purposes while at the same time recognizing and supporting individual
interest in privacy protection. If the government’s broad interpretation
were accepted, however, then all records that “might be relevant” would be
disclosed and the very protections of the Federal Privacy Act would be

301
See Freeman v. EPA, No. 02-0387, 2004 WL 2451409, at *7 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2004) (making
such an argument).
302
See 8 U.S.C. § 1722(a)(2) (2012) (containing no provision regarding the use of Blanket
Routine Use 6 to be used as a means of investigation).
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303

eviscerated.
Thus, in order to strike the balance identified in the Privacy Act’s
legislative history and to support basic concepts of informational privacy,
it would be most appropriate if the FBI were not permitted to
indiscriminately share fingerprints with the DHS for immigration purposes.
Alternatively, it would be more appropriate if the FBI could only disclose
fingerprints after a relevant inquiry was made from the DHS or if the FBI
were only entitled to send the fingerprints of a person they know or believe
to be an alien. Providing these limited alternative protections against the
indiscriminate sharing of information strikes a balance between the rights
of the government to share information and the rights of individuals to
privacy protection that is at the core of the Federal Privacy Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
No matter what, if anything, comprehensive immigration reform
delivers, one thing is certain. Federal immigration enforcement at the
border and inside the border will be enhanced. As more resources are
provided for new enforcement programs, existing programs such as SComm will continue to play a critical role in the enforcement of federal
immigration laws. With the shift from an optional to a mandatory program,
state and local governments that do not want to participate in federal
immigration enforcement efforts through the S-Comm program have
several options to abstain from participation, but each option raises a series
of complex questions related to federalism and the proper role of state and
local governments in federal immigration enforcement. Individuals harmed
by the improper application of S-Comm to their particular circumstances
may have remedies as well. However, the broad sweep of exceptions under
the Federal Privacy Act and limitations on the protections of U.S. citizens
and lawful permanent residents make the questions of statutory analysis
nuanced. This Article explores these avenues and concludes that a number
of legally viable options exist to enable states and localities to defy
participation and to provide compensation for injured individuals.
However, each of these options is limited. Given the inherent tension
between the rights of state and local governments to effectively police their
communities and the rights of the federal government to enforce the
303
Kalhan, supra note 191, at 1156–59. Kalhan argues that free information sharing at all times is
not necessarily always a good thing and offers concrete ideas to restore balance back in local control.
Id. Ideas could include enabling states and localities to choose whether or not their officers receive
immigration records when making routine NCIC queries, or modifying S-Comm to enable states and
localities to choose whether to share fingerprint records for immigration enforcement purposes, or even
to refine the flow of fingerprint records from the FBI to the DHS more generally—for example, by
enabling the DHS to access FBI information in the context of specific, pending immigration-related
decisions for which the Department needs the information. Id.
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nation’s immigration laws, S-Comm should be returned to a voluntary optin program and Congress should move swiftly to address immigration
reform in a comprehensive and sustainable manner.

